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Breaking Point: The 1969 American 
Indian Occupation of Alcatraz Island 
Thomas Kahle, Coe College
Introduction
 On November 10, 1969, a young Mohawk Indian named 
Richard Oakes stood thronged by San Francisco news reporters 
and television cameras. The location of this media frenzy was the 
then-abandoned Alcatraz Island, and Oakes, a tall, dark-haired 
twenty-seven-year-old was pressed against the side of a pick-up 
truck answering reporters’ questions. “So what’s this ‘nation’ that 
you want to establish out here?” was the first question audible 
over the crowd’s ruckus.1 Oakes replied, “An Indian nation.”2 
The next inquiry, “[Well] why Alcatraz?” was received with equal 
brevity, as Oakes, struggling to contain his confidence, subtly 
grinned as he remarked: “Because everyone can see it.”3 Then, 
while answering another question concerning the soon-to-be-
built “Indian nation,” Oakes found himself interrupted by one of 
the reporters: “Mr. Oakes, this is Mr. Hannon from the General 
Services Administration (GSA).”4 Recognizing the significance of 
the crowd’s newest and rather serious-looking member, Oakes 
exclaimed: “Mr. Hannon, hi! I have a proclamation that I’d like 
to read to you.”5 In less than five minutes, Oakes read the GSA 
representative a document entitled “The Alcatraz Proclamation 
to the Great White Father and His People” a statement whose 
condemnation of U.S.-Native American relations was as 
noteworthy as its claim that Alcatraz now belonged to a group 
called “American Indians of All Tribes” (IOAT).6 Mr. Hannon, 
who chewed gum and nodded along as if to expedite the speech, 
posed the following query after being handed Oakes’ statement: 
“So, Richard, what are your plans now?”7 When Oakes shrugged 
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and replied, “I guess we can go home,” Mr. Hannon quipped 
at the young Mohawk, “Need a lift?”8 Oakes, not masking his 
satisfaction, beamed and responded: “Sure do!”9 Grinning as 
the crowd dispersed, Mr. Hannon likely thought that he had 
just witnessed the end of a publicity stunt dubbed a day later 
as “Alcatraz’s Indian Invasion.”10 Unbeknownst to the GSA 
representative, November 10, 1969, proved to be just the 
beginning of one of the most monumental protests in Native 
American history. The protest ushered in a decade of indigenous 
activism and marked the end of decades of silent confusion, 
dejection, and frustration.11
 In the late hours of November 20, 1969, less than two 
weeks after Richard Oakes proclaimed the founding of a new 
“Indian nation,” two boats deposited approximately eighty 
Native American men, women, and children onto Alcatraz.12 
The island’s “Indian Invasion,” which Bay Area reporters had 
interpreted as a media “gimmick” just ten days prior, was fully 
ablaze and soon characterized by powwows, national television 
coverage, and a nineteen-month stand-off with the U.S. Coast 
Guard. The events of November 10, while perhaps amusing 
to Mr. Hannon and San Francisco news crews, were anything 
but an impulsive “joke” to the fourteen Bay Area students who 
orchestrated the return “invasion.”13 “We were obsessed with the 
idea of taking Alcatraz,” remarked Al Miller, a military veteran 
and Seminole Indian, who, in 1969, was serving as vice president 
of San Francisco State University’s Student Coalition of American 
Natives (SCAN).14 Along with Oakes, who had been voted 
SCAN’s president, Miller and the twelve other Indian students 
who envisioned the island’s settlement belonged to a “new urban 
generation” of Native Americans.15 Harvey Wells, a member of 
this new generation who led three hundred Indians onto the 
island, offers the first of many revealing insights regarding the 
occupiers: “I guess we got our idea [i.e. reclaiming Alcatraz] from 
[older Indian leaders], but they were reluctant to operate in this 
manner…We just decided that it [was] time for us to govern 
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[our own] destiny.”16 This decision to assert Native Americans’ 
autonomy over their own livelihood stemmed, in other words, 
not from the impulses of a few irritated college students, but 
from sentiments long-present in Indigenous communities. 
 As the above statements indicate, the students who 
organized Alcatraz’s November 10 takeover, as well as many 
of the Indians who followed them back onto the island ten 
days later, had become “fed up” with what they perceived as 
the federal government’s ongoing and “publicly sanctioned” 
abuse of American Indians.17 Although Oakes was civil in his 
meeting with Mr. Hannon, John Trudell, a Sioux Indian who 
emerged as one of the takeover’s primary spokesmen, captures 
the sentiment of the occupiers best: “To put it mildly, we were 
pretty upset.”18 “Upset” was indeed an understatement of the 
occupiers’ disposition, and Trudell, commenting as if to ensure 
that the American public would not mistake IOAT’s motivations, 
asserted in June 1971: “We were tired of the last fifty years [of 
government treatment]…Someone mentioned to me that 
America has an Indian problem. America doesn’t have an Indian 
problem, Indians have an American problem.”19 The “American 
problem” that Trudell alludes to is, to say the least, a complex 
one, rooted in centuries of Native American mistreatment by the 
federal government.20 Although the exploitation of American 
Indians constitutes an expansive area of study, an analysis of the 
inspirations for Alcatraz’s takeover and their intensification in the 
years prior to 1969 is both feasible and this paper’s objective.
 In examining the underlying grievances responsible 
for Alcatraz’s 1969 occupation, it is worthwhile to consider 
the takeover’s logistics as well as the historical discourse that 
has surrounded the event. With regard to the occupation’s 
organization, Alcatraz’s November 10 takeover was not the first 
instance where the island became the subject of Indigenous 
controversy.21 On March 9, 1964, five Sioux Indians occupied 
Alcatraz for four hours, claiming the Rock on the basis of the 
Sioux Treaty of 1868.22 Citing a treaty provision which held that 
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any surplus federal property would revert back to Native American 
ownership, the occupants attempted to obtain Indian rights to 
Alcatraz in federal court only to have their case struck down.23 
The idea of reclaiming the island was resurrected in 1969 by the 
Bay Area college students, who, in the wake of an October fire 
that destroyed the San Francisco Indian Center, saw an opportune 
moment to begin building the “Indian nation” mentioned by 
Oakes.24 Using the Indian Center’s destruction as justification for 
seizing the island, the ’69 occupants argued that the former prison 
could serve as a new Indigenous cultural campus, encompassing an 
all-Indian university, spiritual center, ecology center, and vocational 
rehabilitation program.25 
 While the seizure of Alcatraz would retain potent symbolic 
power, it would not lead to permanent Indian possession of the 
island. In November 1969, IOAT’s Thanksgiving celebration drew 
some four to six hundred demonstrators to the island, but logistical 
support and activist turnout steadily declined from winter 1970 
to June 1971.26 Conjunction between the U.S. Coast Guard and 
General Services Administration (GSA), the federal agency then 
entrusted with Alcatraz’s administration, worked effectively to 
undercut the energies of the protest.27 In November ’69, the GSA 
accused the occupiers of trespassing, a charge which the Coast 
Guard enforced by cutting off utilities to the island a month later.28 
This, as well as a partial Coast Guard blockade, left the occupiers 
entirely dependent on donations, which surged in November and 
December 1969, but then dwindled as the takeover faded from 
front page headlines.29 
 By spring 1970, sustaining the takeover, let alone winning 
title to Alcatraz, became exceptionally difficult for IOAT. Sporadic 
access to food, water, and medical supplies undermined the 
protestors’ cohesion, with confrontations breaking out between the 
occupation’s architects and later arrivals.30 Oakes, accused of being 
a “sellout” devoted to soliciting funds from white sympathizers, 
distanced himself from the takeover following his twelve-year-
old step-daughter’s death in January 1970.31 With the face of the 
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occupation gone, activists such as LaNada War Jack and John 
Trudell attempted to maintain some semblance of order and 
continuity, negotiating with federal representatives and serving 
as permanent members of an IOAT committee in charge of 
the island’s day-to-day affairs.32 The U.S government, however, 
remained firm in its refusal to relinquish Alzatraz, and talks 
between the two sides went nowhere throughout 1970 and into 
early 1971.33 Although always wary of government intentions, 
the occupiers grew more convinced in the succeeding months 
that federal authorities would seize any opportunity to end 
their protest altogether.34 By the summer of 1971, only fifteen 
protestors remained on the island.35
Alcatraz dock entrance during the Indian Occupation in 1970
 
 Ultimately, a June 1971 fire brought the demonstration 
to a close when it destroyed five of the island’s buildings and a 
lighthouse.36 Citing the need to restore the lighthouse as well as 
prosecute the supposed sale of six hundred and eighty dollars’ 
worth of copper wire from the island, the GSA employed thirty-
five U.S. marshals to remove Alcatraz’s remaining Indians on June 
11, 1971.37 The marshals’ intervention effectively ended Indian 
claims to “the Rock,” but could not erase the takeover’s success 
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in capturing the nation’s consciousness.38 Innumerable American 
Indian protests preceded Alcatraz’s occupation, but none received 
the widespread news coverage of the Bay Area takeover did, a 
disparity which historian Sherry L. Smith describes as Alcatraz 
garnering “more attention than all the Indian struggles of the 
[twentieth century] combined.”39
 Grace Thorpe, a Sac and Fox Indian, Indigenous activist, 
and daughter of the legendary athlete Jim Thorpe, describes 
Alcatraz as “the most important event in American Indian 
movements to date. It made me put my furniture into storage 
and spend my life savings.”40 Although Thorpe’s sentiment may 
not be representative of all Native Americans, historians Sherry 
L. Smith, David L. Milner, Thomas King, Troy Johnson, and 
Joane Nagel have understood Alcatraz’s ’69 takeover as perhaps 
the “catalyst” or “turning point” in twentieth century Indian 
activism.41 Smith, in particular, points out that, amid anti-
Vietnam War protests, clashes between college students and law 
enforcement officials, and the Black Civil Rights Movement, 
Native Americans existed “well below the radar screen of [1960s] 
national consciousness.”42 Emerging in an era when the federal 
government seemed determined to eliminate Indian tribes as 
“legal, political, and cultural identities,” the Alcatraz takeover, 
according to Milner, may be viewed as a kind of “clarion call” for 
a more confrontational and sustained period of native protest.43 
As King explains, the events that the ’69 occupation ushered in 
(which are commonly grouped under the moniker “Red Power”) 
brought national attention to the harsh realities of “Indian [life 
and] country.”44 Native activists’ 1972 seizure of the federal 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the 1973 occupation of the 
town of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, for instance, profoundly 
“struck a chord” with non-indigenous Americans who had already 
grown weary of the American War in Vietnam.45 According to 
Johnson and Nagel, the American public, which had become 
captivated by images of overmatched Indians carrying hunting 
rifles against armored carriers at Wounded Knee, needed to look 
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back only two years to understand the genesis of the unfolding 
Indian insurgency.46 “[It] all began on Alcatraz,” is the consensus 
of the aforementioned historians, who view the ’69 takeover 
and the events that followed as forcing the American public to 
contemplate, or at the very least, acknowledge, twentieth century 
Indians holding firm to their cultural identity.47
 By contrast, historians Bradley Shreve, Carolyn Strange, 
Tina Loo, and Paul Rosier contextualize Alcatraz in a larger 
history of Indian activism, and in doing so, challenge Alcatraz 
as the genesis of twentieth century Indian resistance. Shreve, 
for example, mentions that highlighting the ’69 takeover as 
the commencement of the Red Power Movement obscures 
how Indigenous activists followed in the footsteps of earlier 
generations.48 Broadly expanding on this point, Strange and Loo 
stress that “Indian discontent and mobilization for change” did 
not begin with Alcatraz but “had been brewing for a decade prior 
to the occupation.”49 Likewise, Smith, albeit generally, claims that 
Indigenous frustration was especially made manifest in Northwest 
Pacific Indians’ fight for fishing rights in the 1960s, a struggle that 
was gradually turning national attention to the plight of American 
Indians, only to have Alcatraz “secure” that attention in 1969.50 
Ultimately, however, these historians offer only a limited analysis 
of the takeover’s roots in earlier decades.
 Altogether, the inspirations for Alcatraz’s occupation 
and are referenced but hardly explained in these historical 
narratives. The Indian frustration responsible for the Alcatraz 
takeover emerged amid a pervasive challenging of American 
politics’ “status quo,” and thus remains shrouded by the broader 
upheaval of the 1960s.51 As Rosier explains, mid-twentieth 
century Indigenous activists, Black Civil Rights leaders, feminists, 
and labor organizers all reacted against American Cold War 
conformity, while being indiscriminately grouped together.52 Yet, 
Alcatraz’s occurrence in an era characterized by Black Power, the 
Chicano Movement, feminism, and Third World Liberation Front 
strikes should not hide the deeper roots of specific Indian 
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grievances, for Alcatraz was anything but an “accident.”53 In fact, 
the occupation’s conception came from a combination of long-
developing motivations and the spirit of the age, and, as such, is 
better seen as the breaking point for twentieth century Native 
American activism, rather than a starting point.54
 With contemporary scholarship largely glossing over the 
’69 takeover’s inspirations, this paper explicitly identifies Alcatraz 
as the culmination of Native American grievances specific to 
mid-twentieth century Indigenous welfare. In particular, it 
argues that the motivations which drove the occupation derived 
from the socio-economic status of Native Americans and the 
struggle of Indigenous peoples to maintain their culture of 
“Indianness.”55 Alcatraz’s occupiers, in effect, viewed destitute 
Indian reservations, their “termination” through 1950s federal 
policy, and the relocation of Indigenous peoples in urban areas as 
being at the very center of Native American social and economic 
woes. Meanwhile, they attributed the dying of Indigenous 
culture to a white American society that was, at best, indifferent 
to the survival of Indian lifeways. Imbued with these convictions, 
Alcatraz’s Indian occupiers administered “the Rock” in a manner 
that prioritized the flourishing of Indigenous customs while 
dismissing white American influence. All this considered, 
recognition of the Alcatraz occupation as simply the moment 
which roused Native Americans to protest their treatment by the 
federal government is, in effect, shortsighted.56 Alcatraz’s 1969 
takeover not only marks the beginning of an era of confrontation 
towards the status of Indigenous peoples, but the climax of 
twentieth century American Indian discontent.
 In explaining Alcatraz as the culmination of Indian 
disgruntlement, this project draws on a wide range of primary 
source materials. First are thirty-seven Native American newspaper 
articles written between 1960 and 1971 and archived on the 
Newberry Library’s American Indian Histories and Cultures 
Database. A valuable insight into Indian sentiment regarding 
the socio-economic status of Native peoples as well American 
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government and culture, these articles are used to gauge the 
attitudes of indigenous peoples both in the lead up to and during 
the Alcatraz occupation. Second, six government censuses and 
surveys as well as two series of BIA relocation records are used 
to assess the social status of twentieth century Native Americans, 
conveying the hardships of Indigenous communities both before 
and during the ’69 takeover. Third, thirty-four news footage 
broadcasts, nearly all of which contain interviews of the Alcatraz 
occupants, have been attained via San Francisco State University’s 
Bay Area Television Archive. In addition to providing visual 
references of an Indian-administered Alcatraz, these broadcasts 
reveal the occupiers’ motivations for taking the island and their 
translation into the Rock’s Indigenous government. Finally, 
publications of the Alcatraz Indians of All Tribes newsletter and 
an additional fifty-two participant interviews serve a purpose 
similar to that of the broadcasts. These interviews have been 
attained through various sources: the University of New Mexico’s 
American Indian Historical Research Project; the Doris Duke 
Oral History Project at the University of Utah; Troy Johnson’s 
The American Indian Occupation of Alcatraz Island: Red Power and 
Self-Determination; American Indians, a compilation of primary 
and secondary source materials pertaining to Indigenous studies; 
The Thunder Before the Storm: The Autobiography of Clyde Bellecourt 
as told to Jon Lurie; Heather Rae’s 2005 documentary, Trudell; 
a 1994 interview of Wilma Mankiller conducted through the 
University of Washington-Seattle; a 2017 interview of LaNada 
War Jack conducted through the California Historical Society; 
War Jack’s “Reflections of Alcatraz” published in the University 
of California-Los Angeles’ Gathering Native Scholars; and, lastly, 
the 2014 documentary We Hold the Rock and Footage World, an 
online library of stock media footage.
 As Milner, Johnson, Nagel, and King have noted, the ’69 
takeover “effectively ended” long before U.S. Marshals forced 
the remaining occupants off the island on June 11, 1971.57 In a 
manner ironically mirroring centuries of white-Native relations, 
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national news and Bay Area reporters insisted on designating 
“spokesmen” for the occupation just as European colonists 
demanded that Native tribes delegate “chiefs” or “chieftains.”58 
As already referenced, the occupation faltered when later arrivals 
of activists verbally and physically confronted those Indians 
who had planned the early stages of the takeover and had since 
been declared its leaders by the media.59 LaNada War Jack, John 
Trudell, Al Miller, Adam Fortunate Eagle, Stella Leach, Joe Bill, 
Ed Castillo, Ross Harden, and, of course, Oakes himself (the 
so-called “mayor of Alcatraz”) were among those who the press 
repeatedly interviewed concerning the occupation’s planning 
and sustainment.60 Consequently, the voices of these participants 
are disproportionately heard in the takeover’s coverage as well as 
in the scholarly literature that has since followed. Yet, this fact 
and there being no definite record of the number of Indians 
who passed through occupied Alcatraz, does not render these 
individuals’ testimonies any less valuable.61 The aforementioned 
activists were, after all, the occupation’s original organizers 
and many played central roles in the island’s administration.62 
Rather, it is simply unfortunate that the experiences of so many 
of the occupiers have never been recorded, as activist Peter Blue 
Cloud once remarked: “We [i.e. the occupiers] came everywhere 
from reservations and urban settlements, government boarding 
schools, street gangs, giant plains, and desert, horse people, 
sheep herders, fishermen of the coastal rivers, [and] hunters of 
the frozen north.”63 With these voices lost, this study and all 
others concerning the ’69 occupation remain at a disadvantage 
in capturing the Alcatraz occupation’s true nature: that of a 
nationwide Native American movement composed of similar, 
but also markedly distinct, peoples.
 Lastly, discussion of the motivations cited as inspiring 
Alcatraz’s 1969 takeover assumes an order which demonstrates the 
emergence of a breaking point for Indigenous peoples. Offered 
first are historiographical accounts of Indian reservations, federal 
Termination policy, and the Employment Assistance Program. 
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Following these are the Alcatraz occupiers’ opinions, which explain each 
factor’s contribution to the ’69 takeover. Afterwards, a section devoted 
to the dying of “Indianness” addresses another defining aspect of 
1950s/60s Indian welfare. Attention is given to Black Power’s influence 
on the occupiers before discussion turns to the BIA’s oversight of Indian 
education, IOAT’s encouraging other Indigenous protests, and IOAT’s 
implementing a “white ban” on Alcatraz. As before, historiographical 
accounts of these events precede the Alcatraz occupiers’ opinions of 
each. In the end, these sections aim to explain Native Americans’ social 
and economic woes and frustration over their fading culture as creating 
a “do or die” moment in the struggle to salvage Indian livelihood. It 
was at this particular moment that Alcatraz’s occupiers acted with the 
conviction that the very existence of Indigenous peoples was at stake.
Motivations Part I: Native American Homelands, Termination, and 
Urban Relocation
 In turning to the grievances that led to Alcatraz’s 1969 
occupation, the socio-economic status of twentieth century Native 
Americans first warrants consideration. First, discussion of the 
Alcatraz occupiers’ frustration with American Indian welfare will 
always entail some reference to the “special [pieces of ] land” known 
as “reservations.”64 Established a full century before policies such as 
termination and relocation, reservations constitute territories set 
aside by the federal government to house Indians displaced by white 
westward expansion.65 Although instituted as a kind of compensation 
for tribes deprived of their ancestral homelands through fraud, theft, or 
war, the often forcible grouping of Native Americans onto reservations 
proved to be a “watershed experience for [Indigenous peoples], the 
consequences of which proved devastating for Indian culture and 
psychology.”66 As evidenced, the Alcatraz occupiers’ discontent over 
the lack of social and economic mobility then available to Native 
Americans tended to revolve around these tracts of land, be it in their 
poverty, their “termination,” or Indians’ relocation away from them. 
For decades, reservations’ remoteness kept “[Indigenous peoples] out 
of sight and out of mind of…non-Indian [Americans]” in addition to 
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one another.67 However, the diminishment of Indian homelands 
and the movement of their inhabitants to urban areas eventually 
concentrated the anger needed to make Alcatraz’s occupation 
possible.68 By 1969, activists such as Joe Bill, an Inuit and central 
organizer of the ’69 takeover, had come to the conclusion that “a 
real understanding of the problems [facing American Indians]” 
requires “living the life of an Indian,” an experience inextricably 
linked to reservation life and the difficulties of escaping it.69 
 An understanding of reservations as a “breeding ground” 
for the frustration behind the ’69 occupation begins with the 
“uncanny resemblance” between the physical conditions present 
on Indian homelands and those on “America’s Devil’s Island.70 In 
“The Alcatraz Proclamation to the Great White Father and His 
People,” the November 10 statement read by Richard Oakes, the 
takeover’s organizers facetiously cited the following characteristics 
as rendering the former prison “more than suitable” to serve as 
another American Indian reservation: 
 1. It is isolated from modern facilities, and without 
 adequate means of transportation. 
 2. It has no fresh running water.
 3. It has inadequate sanitation facilities.
 4. There are no oil or mineral rights. 
 5. There is no industry and so unemployment is very 
 great.
 6. There are no health-care facilities.
 7. The soil is rocky and non-productive, and the land 
 does not support game.
 8. There are no educational facilities.
 9. The population has always exceeded the land base.
 10. The population has always been held as prisoners and 
 kept dependent upon others.71 
A rather frank and forthright critique of the conditions present 
on American Indian homelands, the above “justifications” for 
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 taking over Alcatraz in particular stemmed from the fact that 
nearly non-existent water supplies, health care facilities, schools, 
and job opportunities had long constituted reservation life.72 In a 
1935 survey commissioned by the South Dakota Relief Agency, 
state labor and health inspectors ruled that nearly all of South 
Dakota’s ten reservations existed in an “absolute state of want.”73 
Characterized by schools that offered little more than a fifth grade 
education, one-room tar paper houses without plumbing or 
access to clean water, and a prevalence of disease described by the 
commission as “dire,” these native communities were declared, to 
little surprise, “wholly dependent on the state…for subsistence.”74 
Yet, if these descriptions are not startling enough, it is one of 
the survey’s initial statements that is perhaps the most alarming: 
“Living conditions on these [South Dakota] reservations are 
characteristic of those on most Indian reservations.”75 Of course, 
this survey was not intended to address the conditions of the over 
three hundred reservations then-present in the United States. Its 
assumption that the “deplorable state of affairs” present on South 
Dakota’s reservations could not be that different from the rest of 
the nation’s reservations is, to say the least, disturbing.76 
 In retrospect, the findings of studies such as that of 
South Dakota’s 1935 Emergency Relief Administration seem 
hardly exaggerated. National surveys conducted in succeeding 
decades attest to minimal socio-economic progress on 
reservations, conditions which inspired activists such as Joe Bill 
to remark: “We [Native Americans]…have been broken down 
and separated [and] forgotten for the last seventy years!”77 For 
IOAT, the widespread destitution of Indigenous homelands was 
a resounding testament to the federal government’s neglecting 
Indian economic woes and the lack of means needed to escape 
them. Born into environments where Indians could supposedly 
survive both financially and culturally, Alcatraz occupiers ranging 
from John Trudell to Wilma Mankiller to Richard Oakes came 
to view their takeover of the desolate Bay Area island as a fitting 
representation of the barren lands more conducive to keeping 
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Native Americans in poverty than removing them from it. 
 At the age of seventeen, John Trudell volunteered to 
serve in the United States Navy, and was later stationed on a 
destroyer along the coast of Vietnam. Although willing to joke 
to interviewers that he made the right choice joining the navy 
because the Vietnamese didn’t have any ships of their own, 
Trudell never kidded about his motivations for enlistment: “The 
only reason I [joined] the military was because I needed to get 
away from where I was. It wasn’t about politics, patriotism, or 
anything else – it was about survival.”78 Trudell grew up on the 
impoverished Santee Reservation in Nebraska, where he lost 
his mother at the age of six and failed to finish high school.79 
Confronting the adversities of reservation life was, however, an 
experience hardly unique to Trudell, as Wilma Mankiller also 
wrestled with poverty on the Oklahoma Cherokee Reservation. 
One of eleven children, Mankiller and her family relocated 
to San Francisco in 1956 after having no food, electricity, or 
plumbing on their Oklahoma farm.80 Despite the distances 
travelled by Trudell and Mankiller, the experience of having to 
overcome poverty on their homelands proved inescapable. As a 
junior high student in the Bay Area, Mankiller felt surrounded by 
“children from another planet” when she observed white school 
children “[riding] bicycles…roller skating…[using] a telephone, 
or [doing] all the things [we’d never done before].”81 Mankiller 
terms what she and other relocated Indians experienced a “cultural 
shock” that gradually transformed into an “awakening” when a 
young generation of Native Americans began contemplating the 
juxtaposition between reservation life and that of mainstream 
America.82
 For the Alcatraz occupiers, coming to grasps with 
the seemingly endless disparities between reservation life and 
comfortable urban living, a status which Indians more often 
glimpsed than attained, proved to be a painstaking but well-
understood process by 1969. As a child, Richard Oakes not only 
spent time on the St. Regis Reservation in upstate New York, 
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but also in Brooklyn where his father worked as an ironworker.83 
Exposure to an abundance of wealth in New York City left a 
young Oakes wondering if there was “something [he] could do 
for [his] people [on the reservation].”84 Having no solution in 
his youth, Oakes would carry this question to the Bay Area in 
1968, where, joining other Indians, he would discuss why many 
Americans could know materialism while Indigenous peoples 
could not.85 The contrast between reservation poverty and the 
prosperity present off Indian homelands was, in other words, 
a dizzying experience for Alcatraz’s occupiers. However, only a 
transition this disorienting could have produced a response of 
Alcatraz’s magnitude as Mankiller explains: “All [Indian] tribes 
have endured periods of upheaval…[but leaving the reservation 
and participating in the occupation] was [itself ] a watershed 
experience.”86
 Although disorienting at first, relocation to urban 
environments worked to heighten Trudell, Mankiller, and 
other Alcatraz occupiers’ understanding of reservation poverty 
by 1969. No longer internally wrestling with life on the “Rez,” 
IOAT activists gradually developed the confidence to contest 
reservation conditions outright, with one twenty-one year-old 
Yakima occupier going so far as to denounce Indian homelands as 
American “concentration camps.”87 LaNada War Jack, employing 
less evocative language but possessing much of the same sentiment 
as her Yakima counterpart, remarked that one of the occupation’s 
major inspirations was the desire to “focus attention on [the fact] 
that Indians on reservations throughout the nation…were living 
in poverty and suffering great injustice.”88 War Jack’s comment 
later found a voice in a collective statement issued by IOAT, which 
described the Alcatraz occupiers as having grown “concerned” not 
only about their “own livelihood” but about “what was happening 
on the reservations.”89 According to Cree activist Linda Aranaydo, 
the events taking place on reservations constituted none other 
than “the destruction of what [cultural] identity Indians have 
[left].”90 For Aranaydo, “white men” had “proved successful to 
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a certain extent” in eliminating the Indian’s “sense” of him- or 
herself as “Indian” by isolating Indigenous peoples in “prisoner 
of war camps,” their own reservations.91 Alcatraz’s occupation, 
however, represented an attempt to “salvage” that identity by 
revealing reservations as “oppressive spaces” paralyzing “[Indians’ 
efforts] to rise economically as individuals.”92 Channeling this 
thought, Alcatraz’s occupiers presented their cause as not only 
ending the spatial and personal “division” that reservations had 
created amongst Native Americans, but drawing attention to a 
means of living rendering the Indian no more than a “useless 
entity” both to him/herself and his/her community.93 The ’69 
occupation, in other words, reflected both a weariness with 
reservations’ lack of socio-economic development and the 
cycle of impoverishment that such stasis produced. For IOAT, 
ignorance of this cycle, especially among Indigenous peoples, 
guaranteed that reservations would continue functioning in the 
manner they always had: worsening Native American financial 
woes and crippling Indians’ inability to effect their own cultural 
and economic survival. 
 When Indian activists staked their claim to America’s Devil 
Island in November ’69, they offered an unmistakable parallel to 
the bleak plots of land where Indigenous peoples had been holed 
up for generations. For nineteen months, Alcatraz’s occupiers tied 
themselves to a rock as inextricably as other American Indians 
found themselves bound to their reservations. The San Francisco 
Bay island effectively became the axis around which IOAT’s 
cause revolved just as reservations, regardless of Indian wishes, 
constituted Indigenous “homes…heritages…and [everything 
Native Americans had].”94 From IOAT’s perspective, reservations 
were not working to preserve American Indian autonomy, but 
isolating Indigenous peoples and denying them the resources 
needed to ascend economically. In 1970, Navajo Indian and 
Alcatraz activist La Rayne Parrish affirmed this position with the 
statement: “A lot [of the occupiers] have experienced reservation 
life; they know what it is like, they know what the feeling is when 
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their parents have to live on [government] welfare, when they 
have to depend on…government services, just for a job, just for 
a livelihood to exist.”95 Indeed, some of the activists who have 
become most synonymous with the ’69 takeover never lost sight 
of their upbringings on reservations, ultimately carrying their 
experiences with them into cities and onto Alcatraz itself.
 Born figuratively and literally outside the consciousness 
of non-Native Americans, the occupiers that Parrish describes 
were raised in spaces that, by 1958, Soviet propaganda had 
adopted in discrediting its rival superpower, claiming that the 
U.S.’s management of reservations would lead to “the gradual 
extinction” of Indigenous peoples.96 A rather bold statement, 
1968 national surveys seemed to award credence to the Soviet 
claim when they indicated that Americans were grossing $170 
million from agricultural products and charging up to $0.75 per 
board of lumber.97 These sales should have corresponded with a 
substantial growth in wealth for the 764,000 Indians nationwide, 
as lumber and agriculture comprised two of the primary industries 
within reservation communities.98 Instead, as if to confirm a 
Euro-centric stereotype that Native Americans were incapable of 
embracing market capitalism, reservation agriculture accounted 
for only $16 million of the $170 million grossed, while reservation 
lumber sold at a paltry $0.18 per board.99 When asked to explain 
these discrepancies, Indians themselves attributed this absence 
of economic growth not to a failure to engage market forces, 
but an inability to overcome factional divisions.100 The divisions, 
sown into reservation life through decades of poverty, were the 
result of Indians battling one another over what few resources 
were available.101 Feeling compelled to abandon collective efforts 
in favor of individual survival, generations of Native Americans, 
including those responsible for Alcatraz’s occupation, found 
themselves becoming further entrenched in an endless cycle of 
impoverishment.102
 By 1969, an upbringing in what some Indians termed 
America’s own “concentration camps,” where poverty not only 
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threatened individual welfare but communal unity, led War 
Jack and fellow occupier Marilyn Miracle to assert that few 
Alcatraz occupiers “just jumped in and joined [the takeover].”103 
Rather, participation in the occupation represented “a lifelong 
thing,” an inspiration that “came from way back, back from the 
reservation.”104 Simply put, Indian frustration over impoverished 
reservation conditions did not arise suddenly in the fall of 1969, 
but had been kindling within the Alcatraz activists and other 
Indians since childhood. In the later half of the 1960s, IOAT’s 
members, although driven from their homelands in desperation, 
succeeded in finding one another and channeling their anger into 
a common cause. These activists, recognizing that all Indians 
had endured decades of neglect and financial ruin, envisioned 
a protest on America’s most infamous prison-island as a fitting 
representation of the destitution which Indigenous peoples had 
come to know so well.105
* * * * *
 While reservation conditions may have first stoked the 
ire of the Alcatraz occupiers, it was the federal government’s 
1950s Termination policy that further incensed American 
Indians bonded together in urban environments. Broadly 
defined, Termination was the federal government’s forced 
assimilation of Native Americans into mainstream American 
culture, be it legally, socially, or economically.106 Since 1934, 
the tribal governments that administered reservations were 
recognized as having some version of sovereign power over their 
lands and tribal members.107 Congress, in other words, treated 
Indian tribes as “domestic, dependent nations” possessing 
everyday civil and criminal jurisdiction.108 These powers afforded 
Indians the right to organize their own governments, legislate 
and adjudicate, determine tribal membership, levy and collect 
taxes, and oversee the development of Indigenous land.109 With 
the advent of Termination, however, over a hundred Native 
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American tribes were stripped of their title as “sovereign entities,” 
exposing them to a host of federal regulations to which they were 
unaccustomed.110 Primary among these were the application 
of state, income, property, and sales taxes, and states’ ability to 
assume control of reservation resources.111 In addition, Native 
American tribes found themselves deprived of the “special 
services” once administered by the federal government, including 
health, education, and welfare assistance not available to the non-
Indian population.112 Termination, in effect, rendered obsolete 
the trust relationship that previously existed between tribes and 
the federal government and afforded Native Americans some 
degree of autonomy.113 From the early 1950s until 1970, Indians, 
who had briefly been recognized as self-governing, were liable 
to being treated no differently from any other citizen living in a 
particular state.114
 The emergence of Termination was, in many ways, a 
continuation of the federal government’s almost century-old 
policy of Indian assimilation, one which Indigenous activists 
were condemning outright by 1969.115 As early as 1871, the 
formal end of the “treaty period” between Indian tribes and the 
federal government, Congressional factions began advocating the 
disregard of tribal leaders.116 With this came calls to break up 
tribal estates via allotting reservation land to individual Indians.117 
In 1887, these pressures culminated in the Dawes or General 
Allotment Act, which ordered the dividing of reservations into 
individual plots to be farmed and owned by Indians.118 Had the 
allotment policy been carried out successfully, it would have 
ended the reservation system altogether, and individualized 
relations between Indians and the federal government.119 Instead, 
the Dawes Act’s efforts faltered when Indians were awarded barren 
lands and given little instruction in farming.120 “[Land] hungry 
white settlers” ultimately preyed upon Indian unfamiliarity 
toward homesteading and wrested control of almost two-thirds 
of Indigenous land, an event which the federal government 
attempted to curtail via the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act 
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(IRA).121 Although calling for an end to allotment and a return 
to Indian communal or “home rule,” the IRA encouraged the 
revitalization of tribal organizations only so far as it might lead 
to Indians’ eventual assimilation.122 By the late-1940s, the notion 
that strengthening tribal institutions might serve as “preparatory 
steps” for assimilation had succumbed to congressional calls 
for more rapid Indian integration.123 Termination, in effect, 
emerged as the answer to these calls, replacing Native Americans’ 
jurisdiction over their lands with that of states’, and inspiring the 
indignation of Indians who came of age in the policy’s aftermath.
 The impetus for Termination and their subsequent 
effect on the nation’s American Indian population stemmed 
from a wide range of motives, albeit all contributing to what 
IOAT perceived as a wholesale assault on Indian sovereignty.124 
Rosier, for one, identifies Termination as an example of the 
“Cold War imperative of ‘ethnic integration,’” arguing that 
the congressional discourse surrounding it mirrored that of the 
international standoff between the United States and Soviet 
Union.125 In other words, congressmen spoke of Termination 
as if corresponding with the American effort to “liberate the 
enslaved peoples of the world,” peoples which “included Indians 
‘confined’ in…socialistic environments [i.e. reservations].”126 
Ulrich and Burt, meanwhile, consider Termination as resulting 
from the emergence of a conservative bloc of western American 
congressmen in the postwar era.127 In addition to viewing 
traditional Indian communal structures as too similar to 
“dreaded Soviet ones,” these congressmen were searching for 
new sources of revenue amidst a tremendous economic boom 
in the farming, stock raising, lumber, mining, manufacturing, 
and service industries.128 Indian land, with federal protections 
prohibiting its sale and subsequent development, found itself at 
the forefront of congressional calls to be “properly taxed” as early 
as 1944.129 By 1953, terminationist congressmen were frequently 
referencing the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which granted 
U.S. citizenship to Native Americans, as warranting Indians’ 
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treatment as individuals rather than as members of discrete 
social and political groups.130 For terminationists, the separate 
governmental and land-holding status of reservations were a 
violation of the very economic politico-economic system of 
the United States; that is, one of individual property rights and 
private enterprise.131 In the end, these attitudes culminated in 
the federal government’s massive withdrawal from Indian affairs 
and services, which, regardless of its true intentions, was hailed 
by some congressmen as allowing Indians to enjoy the freedoms 
of competing in an unfettered marketplace.132
 Yet, while motives for Termination may have ranged 
significantly among congressmen, the federal government’s formal 
decision to revoke tribes’ sovereignty while discontinuing “special 
services” for Indians was especially influenced by the low regard 
with which the BIA was held.133 Shared in concert with the belief 
that reservations were economically unsalvageable, criticism of 
the BIA was largely financial and based on the premise that the 
agency was tending to idle Indians.134 By 1946, the department 
was popularly described as bloated “with personnel whose salaries 
and travel expenses drain…the vast sums that Congress [already] 
appropriates for…Indian tribes.”135 It was at this time that the 
Senate Committee on Civil Service “zeroed in” on the BIA as 
one of several federal agencies possessing an excess of employees. 
The committee encouraged elected officials and the BIA’s own 
commissioner, Dillon Myer, to describe the Bureau as needing to 
“get out of the [Indian] business as quickly as possible.”136 
 Meanwhile, a series of blizzards which struck the Navajo 
and Hopi reservations in 1950 provided the opportunity for 
western congressmen to justify their claim that only states, rather 
than Indians themselves, could properly manage reservation 
resources.137 The blizzards proved so devastating that the affected 
tribes required rescuing via airlift, a response which inspired 
Congress to investigate the conditions which allowed for such 
havoc to ensue.138 Upon finding that the Navajo territory had 
housed an excess of 20,000 inhabitants, terminationists in 
78     Thomas Kahle  
American Indian Occupation of Alcatraz
Congress seized on the revelation and declared the Navajo and 
Hopis’ situation to be indicative of Indian homelands at large.139 
These congressmen argued, in effect, that no reservation possessed 
the land base needed to support its population, and that any and 
all rehabilitation efforts toward Indian land would prove futile.140 
This argument, or “surplus population theory,” served to validate 
western congressmen’s stance that Native Americans would only 
find adequate work off their reservations, and that responsibility 
for tribal land should pass into states’ jurisdiction.141 In 1953, 
congressional consensus over BIA dysfunction and reservations’ 
economic futility culminated in House Concurrent Resolution 
108 (HCR-108), which, in addition to existing legislation, 
initiated what IOAT denounced as the unjustified passage of 
some 2,595,414 acres of land out of Indian hands.142
 While the National Congress of American Indians 
(NCAI), the nation’s perhaps most formidable outlet for 
Indigenous grievances, managed to halt the continuation of 
Termination legislation in 1957, the widespread passage of land 
out of Indigenous hands continued to rankle American Indian 
sentiment throughout the 1960s.143 Prior to IOAT’s emergence, 
the NCAI, in a 1960 letter to over four hundred constituents, 
decried Termination as the “final negation” of what it considered 
to be the federal government’s primary commitment to Native 
Americans: “[Indigenous] education, in the broadest sense of the 
word, and [the establishment] of an efficient educational agency, 
devoting its main energies to the social and economic advancement 
of…Indians.”144 Termination had, in the NCAI’s opinion, 
worked to the complete opposite of this principle by allowing 
for the removal of “already inadequate [Indian] resources,” of 
which Native Americans themselves could be “the instigators and 
planners.”145 At its conclusion, the NCAI letter declared that if 
any means still existed to reverse the trend of “poverty and lack 
of social adjustment which had [come to] dominate [studies of 
Native Americans] for more than thirty years,” a National Indian 
Commission needed establishing to protect Indian resources and 
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Termination needed outright abandonment.146
 In the nine years that separated the NCAI letter 
and Alcatraz’s takeover, American Indian condemnation of 
Termination not only persisted, but assumed an increasingly 
antagonistic tone. Throughout the 1960s, the NCAI worked 
within existing political systems to lobby the federal government 
to reverse Termination.147 The organization’s 1957 success in 
halting Termination legislation served to strengthen its conviction 
that Indian reform could be affected by working in conjunction 
with the government rather than protesting against it.148 In 
1967, the NCAI went so far as to encapsulate this belief with 
the statement, “Indians Don’t Demonstrate,” a remark pointedly 
aimed at younger cohorts of Native Americans, who were not 
only criticizing Termination, but the officials dictating Indian 
policy.149 Poor reservation conditions, as well as Termination’s 
diminishment of Indian land, were responsible for concentrating 
these younger Indians in urban areas where their frustration and 
confusion could coalesce. In what Indigenous historian Alvin 
M. Josephy labels “termination psychosis,” Native Americans 
displaced by reservation poverty or the federal government’s 
attempt to terminate Indian homelands exhibited “an all-
pervading suspicion of government motives in Indian Affairs.”150 
Trudell, Mankiller, and Oakes are just a few Alcatraz occupiers 
who belonged to this class of Native Americans, experiencing 
confusion and anxiety perhaps deserving of the term “psychosis.” 
However, these Indians’ joint immersion in the Bay Area allowed 
them to find one another, and, in doing so, embolden their 
understanding of Termination’s motivations and their willingness 
to demand the policy’s repeal.
 In the lead-up to the Alcatraz occupation, LaNada War 
Jack was one activist especially willing to confront Termination, 
even losing her job in the process. Poverty on the Fort Hall 
Reservation (ID) inspired War Jack’s relocation to the Bay 
Area in 1965, after which she took a job alongside another 
future Alcatraz activist, Lehman Brightman, at San Francisco’s 
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American Indian Center.151 Although not personally spurred to 
move by Termination, War Jack, while directing the American 
Indian Center’s newspaper, became absorbed in a Bay Area 
Indian community that had experienced the policy.152 Alongside 
Brightman, who served as the paper’s editor, War Jack drew the 
ire of the center’s older members when her publications began 
“making too much noise.”153 Due to its criticizing Termination 
and urban relocation, the center’s elder directors condemned 
War Jack and Brightmans’s work as straying beyond the accepted 
realms of petition and reform into outright defiance.154 While 
fired for breaking an unspoken rule that “Indians don’t protest,” 
War Jack and Brightman came to exemplify Wilma Mankiller’s 
observation that “poverty without community is very different 
from poverty where there is a group of people who share a…
common history…and some sense of responsibility for one 
another.”155 Termination, to be sure, allowed states to assume 
Native American land, and, in doing so, worked to thrust 
already poor Indians into foreign environments. However, once 
concentrated in these environments, Indians such as War Jack 
and Brightman began to recognize Termination, like reservation 
poverty, as a shared transgression among Indigenous people.
 Many other Alcatraz occupiers, over the course of the 
1960s, came to understand Termination as depriving Indians of 
their already-limited land and resources. An adolescent Richard 
Oakes, for instance, was observant of the palpable “fear” that set 
in on the St. Regis Reservation after its inhabitants realized that 
Termination could allow for their arrest, trial, and prosecution in 
racially biased New York courts.156 Although a deeply “disruptive” 
event in Oakes’s youth, Termination did not become a driving 
force in the young Mohawk’s political life until bartending 
in 1960s San Francisco revealed a host of stories regarding 
Termination’s effect on “[Indian] communities…homes…
and families.”157 Much of the same applies to Adam Fortunate 
Eagle, whose involvement in numerous Bay Area Indian 
organizations facilitated his understanding of Termination as a 
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masked government effort designed to “wipe out” reservations, 
abrogate the remaining treaties between Native Americans and 
the United States, and reduce funding for the BIA.158 Finally, 
Wilma Mankiller’s exposure to the Bay Area’s atmosphere of 
“social and political revolution,” which had “everybody [thinking 
that] everything was possible,” also inspired her to reflect more 
critically on Indian policy.159 Upon realizing that Termination 
was none other than another “government [policy]…designed 
to make sure that Indians…no longer kept [their] language…
cultural identity…and most importantly [their] land and natural 
resources” Mankiller was left alarmed, and searching for an outlet 
to express her dismay.160
 In January 1970, the Alcatraz occupiers, then fully 
immersed in the Rock’s takeover, issued a newsletter exemplifying 
their recognition of Termination as not only a common Native 
American experience, but one jeopardizing the welfare of all 
Indigenous people. Claiming that ownership of the prison was 
“but little to ask” from a government which had engaged in 
centuries of “systematically stealing Indian lands…polluting air 
and water…and ripping open the very bowels of the earth in 
senseless greed,” the newsletter identified Termination as none 
other than the most recent federal policy of “theft, suppression, 
and prejudice” toward Native Americans.161 In doing so, the 
newsletter resembled earlier Native American critiques of 
Termination, particularly that of the 1960 NCAI letter, as 
threatening Indian livelihood. However, the publication’s 
use of the terms “stealing,” “prejudice,” and “senseless greed” 
illustrate a distinct shift in rhetoric, one that perhaps manifests 
itself most in the statement’s description of Termination as 
a disguised government effort “to annihilate the [country’s] 
many Indians.”162 In explaining this stark change in tone, John 
Trudell describes a realization among Indians that Termination 
treated Indians more like “statistics” than people.163 According 
to Trudell, this recognition lay not just in the fact that Indians 
came to see themselves as “unemployed and disenfranchised,” as 
they had “always been.”164 Rather, it resided in Native Americans’ 
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increasing capacity to recognize themselves as poor and becoming 
increasingly poorer via Termination’s transfer of Indigenous land 
and their resources out of Indian hands.165 
  At its inauguration in the late-1940s and early-1950s, 
Senator Arthur Watkins, a Republican from Utah, hailed 
Termination as “following in the footsteps [of ] the Emancipation 
Proclamation.”166 Yet, for the Alcatraz occupiers and the American 
Indians who experienced Termination’s effects, being forced 
into mainstream society inspired attitudes that hardly mirrored 
Watkins’ rhetoric. While Watkins supposedly saw Termination 
embellishing the words “THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE” 
over the heads of American Indians, Native Americans largely came 
to view the diminishing of their homelands as an introduction 
to a “meat grinder…called [American] democracy.”167 Although 
terminationists lauded HCR-108 as being in the best interests of 
Native Americans, Indigenous newspapers’ description of such 
legislation attests to it being anything but. By 1969, publications 
such as the Akwesasne Notes were claiming it impossible to find an 
Indian leader who had not rejected Termination, a policy which 
wrested control of Indians’ sovereignty as if they were “children…
[unable to] think for themselves…decide for themselves…[or] 
act for themselves.”168
 By 1969, the perception that Indigenous people needed 
to be assimilated into American society found itself passionately 
rejected by IOAT. For almost two decades, Native Americans 
denounced Termination under the premise that it deprived 
Indians both of the raw materials needed to make socio-
economic gains and the few spaces where they could continue 
living as distinct “tribal peoples.”169 Yet, as more and more Native 
Americans found themselves driven from their homelands in 
the 1950s and 60s, Indian rhetoric toward Termination turned 
increasingly confrontational. While criticisms such as the 1960 
NCAI letter first presented Termination as patronizing Indians’ 
ability to manage their resources, later 1960s activists such as 
Adam Fortunate Eagle went so far as to denounce Termination 
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as “the most insidious federal project of the twentieth century.”170 
Fortunate Eagle and other IOAT members constituted a group of 
Native Americans which, despite being coerced into abandoning 
their communal homelands, came to view themselves as a 
collective. The irony of these activists finding one another and 
assuming the representation of all Indigenous peoples cannot be 
understated given Termination’s explicit effort to notify Indians 
that “‘some day they [are] going to reach the age of 21, and [will 
have to] prepare themselves for [responsibility].”171 Of course, 
IOAT activists more than shouldered the challenge of acting as 
an all-inclusive voice for Native Americans, as they channeled 
two decades of Indian aversion toward Termination into taking a 
nationally recognized icon.
* * * * *
 As Termination exacerbated the destitute realities of 
reservation life, American Indian frustration continued to 
grow after the Employment Assistance Program’s (EAP) false 
proclamation as the “final solution” to Indian poverty.172 As the 
BIA’s urban relocation program, the EAP induced some 30,000 
Native Americans to move to cities in the 1950s and almost 
three times that number during the 1960s and 70s.173 Although 
established with the stated intention of providing reservation 
residents with vocational training and jobs, the EAP worked 
more to dislocate and disintegrate Indigenous communities.174 
“An undeniable force of transformation for Native peoples,” 
urban relocation had the inadvertent effect of “confusing, 
depersonalizing, and [ultimately angering]” an entire generation 
of Indians, among whom included the Alcatraz occupation’s 
architects.175 By the mid-1960s, however, this once nameless 
generation of Native Americans had managed to transform 
confusion into coalescence, emerging as an “increasingly 
organized urban…population” intent on communicating Indian 
experiences on reservations and in cities.176 For Al Miller, the 
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impetus for this search and their culmination in Alcatraz’s takeover 
were none other than Indians “wising up” to the logic behind 
their resettlement: “The policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
to relocate Indians out of the reservation [and] assimilate them 
into greater society backfired.”177 In the end, it was at Alcatraz, 
according to Miller, that Indians unequivocally denounced 
relocation and asserted that Indigenous welfare would continue 
to decline so long as it remained outside the control of Indians 
themselves.178 
 Even before Termination’s institution in 1953, the 
federal government was formulating the EAP as encouragement 
to Indian people to move away from their reservations.179 As a 
kind of appendage to HCR-108, Congress devised a series of 
vocational training initiatives based on the 1930s Navajo-
Hopi work program as an alternative to the nearly non-existent 
employment opportunities on Indigenous homelands.180 The 
program’s final 1962 version provided Indians with a one-way bus 
ticket to one of six relocation centers (Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, 
Denver, Los Angeles, or San Francisco), supplementary income 
for household necessities, and job counseling for a year after 
arrival.181 To encourage Native American participation, BIA field 
offices distributed materials that sported the supposed luxuries 
of city living.182 A collection of these advertisements spanning 
from 1955 to 1975 depict well-dressed American Indian families 
sitting in modern apartment living rooms and dining in kitchens 
with the era’s latest electronic appliances.183 As if these images 
were not appealing enough given the privation of reservation 
life, the BIA often supplemented their marketing materials with 
commentary highlighting a relocated family’s employer, local 
schools, and church groups.184 In mocking these advertisements, 
Fortunate Eagle describes BIA officials ecstatically proclaiming 
to reservation Indians, “Come out and sign up for relocation, 
we’re going to get you an apartment to live in, we’re going to 
ship you free of charge, you and your family [and] grandma 
and grandpa if [they] want to come along too!”185 The kind of 
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cynicism represented by Fortunate Eagle’s ridicule soon became 
commonplace in the lead-up to 1969, as relocated American 
Indians encountered living conditions entirely different from 
government-promised ones. 
 Although many Native Americans viewed relocation 
as a “desperate last resort” to escape reservation poverty rather 
than a choice “between various life alternatives,” few avoided a 
sense of shock upon arriving in their new communities.186 Millie 
Ketcheshawno, a Muskogee Creek Indian and one of the Alcatraz 
occupation’s architects, recalls being astonished after reaching 
Oakland on a BIA-sponsored bus: “[I] got off in a poverty-type area, 
and said [to myself ], ‘oh my gosh this is just what I came from!’”187 
Yet, Ketcheshawno’s surprise does not even begin to capture the 
bewilderment that Indians experienced upon learning that the 
government had little intention of providing the “retention-
based services” that it had promised.188 Initially assured monthly 
stipends and the vocational training needed to obtain steady 
work, relocated Native Americans often had any and all financial 
assistance cut off after finding a job, which, for most, entailed 
easily replaceable unskilled or semiskilled labor.189 The rat and 
roach-infested housing that relocated Indians frequently found 
themselves in only further contradicted the BIA’s glorification 
of city living, as did the agency’s lack of a concerted effort to 
resettle tribal members near one another.190 With limited survival 
counseling in a non-Indian urban environment, including “how 
to use a city map, call on a telephone, use a checking account, or 
purchase goods at a supermarket,” relocatees found themselves 
feeling “hemmed in in a thousand ways.”191
 The sense of fear and trepidation that Native Americans 
often experienced upon arriving in cities is given particular 
expression in a 1969 article for the Native American newspaper 
The Indian. This piece, which is also entitled “The Indian,” 
describes a relocated Lakota Sioux family as “huddled together 
in [an] apartment…unable to look beyond themselves to the 
terrifying white world…because they don’t have the skills, 
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cultural or technical, to cope with it.”192 “Left in an almost 
inhuman situation,” urban Indians often turned to alcoholism 
or to confiding in one another in trade schools, apartment 
hallways, or “Indian bars,” to express their frustration and sense 
of isolation.193 In the end, it was in finding other Indians that 
relocated Native Americans recognized their anger, loneliness, 
and, at times, consequent drunkenness as both a shared experience 
and one exaggerating their socio-economic woes.
 Finding one another was, however, a phenomenon that 
evolved over a near two decades for urban Indians, and specifically 
the occupiers themselves. No relocatee/occupier exemplifies 
this better than Fortunate Eagle, whose success as a Bay Area 
termite exterminator obscured his understanding of just how 
“confused,” “lonely,” and desperate for cultural affinity, let alone 
employment, that Indians were.194 In fact, it took Fortunate 
Eagle almost ten years to awaken to the frustration facing other 
relocatees and Indians in general when, participating in a series 
of powwows in Golden State Park, he became fully immersed 
in the Bay Area’s burgeoning Indian community.195 Throughout 
the early and mid-1960s, the eventual occupier had taken his 
family on trips to his former home, the Red Lake Reservation 
(MN), in an effort to maintain some kind of connection to his 
Chippewa heritage. Oftentimes, these trips led Fortunate Eagle 
to question whether white Americans and Indians themselves 
were more inclined to view Indigenous nations as “souvenirs” 
from some bygone era than as people facing overwhelming 
economic woes.196 This insecurity laid latent within the future 
activist until his involvement in the powwows and a number 
of Bay Area Indian organizations exposed him to a pervasive 
sense of abandonment at the hands of the federal government 
and the mindset that Indians, working together, could do more 
for themselves than any government agency could.197 In other 
words, a decade of listening to and discussing the economic and 
cultural obstacles plaguing Indians from all over the country 
encouraged Fortunate Eagle to look beyond what had once been 
his personal quest for a “Cadillac [and] comfortable [Bay Area] 
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house.”198 By 1969, the Chippewa Indian, who once wondered 
whether Indians would be rendered “caricatures” of some distant 
past, became convinced that a decade’s worth of communal and 
political organizing in the Bay Area had made large-scale protest 
only a phone call away.199
 Early November 1969 proved Fortunate Eagle’s 
inclination true when LaNada War Jack, then head of UC-
Berkeley’s Native Student Organization, received a phone call 
from Oakes, who was serving as president of San Francisco 
State University’s SCAN.200 Like Fortunate Eagle, it had taken 
both War Jack and Oakes months and, in some cases, years after 
relocating to grasp the extent to which all Indians were struggling 
to survive financially and culturally. For War Jack, it was taking 
up residence in a boarding house of some thirty Indian woman in 
1965 that sparked her interest in “looking up” what was “going 
on with Indians [at large] in the Bay Area.”201 By the time she 
gained acceptance to UC-Berkeley in 1968, War Jack was deeply 
disturbed by her finding that most Bay Area Indians, much like 
herself, had been “dropped off” in San Francisco and left to 
fend for themselves with hardly any support from the BIA.202 
Oakes’s experience proved all too similar when, after moving 
to San Francisco in 1968, he obtained work in the Bay Area’s 
Mission District.203 During his aforementioned time bartending, 
Oakes became immersed in Native American “politics of the 
time, [be they concerning] relocation or termination, and [these 
policies’ effects]” on Indians from across the country.204 The 
former ironworker from upstate New York, who once grappled 
with the realities of Termination on his own homeland, gathered 
the stories of these other Indian relocatees and realized that his 
anxieties extended well beyond himself.205 So when rumors of 
a casino being built on Alcatraz surfaced in the fall of 1969, 
Oakes did not hesitate to reach out to War Jack, who, through 
the networks already established among San Francisco Indians at 
Bay Area colleges, knew she would reciprocate his feelings. When 
both agreed that a casino on Alcatraz meant “breaking a treaty 
right…in [Indians’] faces,” a consensus about how to respond 
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was immediately reached: “Enough talk. Let’s just do it.”206
Indian activists on Alcatraz on Thanksgiving Day, 1969
 
 When the almost eighty Indian activists arrived on 
Alcatraz on November 20, 1969, it became clear that they 
had not only managed to find one another amidst relocation, 
but that their frustration toward resettlement had far from 
subsided. As if to encapsulate this, Stella Leach, a spokesman 
for the occupation, answered the following when asked if the 
takeover could solve the problems facing Bay Area Indians: “In 
my mind it [i.e. the occupation] does, especially [regarding] 
the isolation that we’ve been experiencing.”207 This notion of 
relocation as “isolating” serves as just one grim conception, as 
Vine Deloria Jr., former director of the NCAI, cites the EAP 
as misguidedly assuming “that you could take an Indian family 
into the city, give them employment training, help them find 
a house, and [that] they would succeed, which is a definition 
of a human being only in economic terms.”208 Fortunate Eagle 
echoes Deloria’s condemnation of relocation as callous, claiming 
that the federal government was essentially “through with” the 
Alcatraz’s activists after they moved to the city, found some kind 
of work, and received their first paycheck.209 These assertions are, 
to say the least, far from unfounded, especially considering the 
number of services promised to Indians and never made available 
upon relocation.
 Meanwhile, there are few instances that better illustrate 
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American Indian animosity towards urban resettlement than a 
December 1969 newscast, in which Richard Oakes, speaking 
with representatives of the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) and Department of Labor, describes many of the 
Alcatraz occupiers as “dependent on the relocation program [for 
survival].”210 When one of the visiting officials retorts that the 
BIA has “other programs of use [for the relocatees],” a female 
occupier passionately exclaims: “Once relocated…you are 
not Indian anymore. They [i.e. the BIA] think you don’t have 
[the] health problems that they [i.e. Native Americans] have 
on the reservation. No one wants to deal with you. You just 
keep getting referred back to the BIA.”211 War Jack echoes this 
conviction that Indians were being left to fend for themselves 
in environments equally if not more disadvantageous than 
reservations, asserting that “all types of problems [experienced] 
on relocation” left Alcatraz’s occupiers trapped at “the bottom” of 
the socio-economic ladder.212 One especially alarming problem 
that War Jack cites is Indians being left with only two choices 
in urban slums: “kill yourself and get it over with…or try to go 
all the way up [in terms of wealth and social status], [but] this 
is almost impossible.”213 Together, these statements reflect both 
an increasing level of weariness and disgruntlement among the 
Alcatraz occupiers, whose movement aimed to end the isolation 
facilitated by relocation.
 At the conclusion of the Alcatraz takeover, the EAP 
had overseen the resettlement of some 100,000 Native 
Americans, but not without provoking an already aggravated 
demographic.214 Activists such as Mankiller and Fortunate Eagle 
are among those Indians who came to identify relocation, as well 
as its predecessors, reservation confinement and Termination, 
as “just one more policy in a long list of policies” aimed at 
“destroying” American Indian livelihood.215 Assured by an end 
to the economic destitution they had come to know intimately 
well on reservations, relocated Native Americans were fortunate 
if they received a fraction of the social services promised by the 
BIA. These Indians, many of whom included Alcatraz’s future 
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occupiers, often “jumped” to relocate, seeking some alternative 
to their homelands’ non-existent employment opportunities.216 
 In the end, seclusion in “skid row” housing and a near 
total lack of BIA aid, be it cultural or monetary, convinced 
Alcatraz’s occupiers that relocation was but “another insidious 
[means]” of depriving Indians of their lands and resources.217 
Today, inadequate statistics concerning the number of Indians 
who opted to return to their rural homes rather than remain 
resettled inhibit a complete understanding of relocation’s 
failures and the anger they produced.218 However, it remains 
evident that the EAP frustrated and then consolidated a new 
urban generation which would come to serve as the vanguard 
of an emerging confrontational approach to Indian activism.219 
Ramona Bennett, a Puyallup Indian, relocatee, and participant 
in the Nisqually fish-ins, affirmed relocation as a “planned” 
federal effort to “alienate Indians and [their] land” during a 
1970 visit to Alcatraz.220 Ironically, the alienation of Indians, first 
on reservations and then in cities, resulted in a unification of 
Indigenous activists who sought an end to the socio-economic 
destitution that had come to characterize their lives.
Motivations Part II: Dying “Indianness”
 “Wake up Injun! Wake up!” serves as the introduction 
to Yvonne Chapela’s 1968 article “Red Awareness.”221 Published 
in the Native American newspaper The Warpath, the succeeding 
lines of Chapela’s work criticize twentieth century Indigenous 
peoples for abandoning their “Indian culture” to gain acceptance 
in a “white man’s” world:
 YOU, learning German when you don’t even know 
 Navajo or Sioux or Chippewa!
 YOU, thinking you’re a success when you marry a whitey!
 YOU, putting on a tweed suit when attending a pow-
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 pow with mostly all whites dancing!
 YOU, taking a whitey on a tour of your reservation. Look 
 what happened when you first toured the pilgrims!
 Wake up Injun! Wake up!
 YOU, celebrating Thanksgiving!
 YOU, saying “Oh I have a drop of Indian blood in me, 
 but I’m mostly French!”
 YOU, cutting and bleaching your hair to hide what you 
 are!
 
 YOU, kissing the white man’s ass!
 Wake up Injun! Wake up!
 YOU, thinking the BIA is really helping you!
 YOU, believing all that shit written about Indians in 
 history books!
 Wake up Injun! Wake up!
 WAKE UP! RISE! SCREAM! YELL! JUMP! ACT!! 
 BECOME AWARE!!!!!!!!...Before you turn around and 
 never hear the word “Indian” again.222
The article’s final line, that of “never [hearing] the word ‘Indian’ 
again,” may first appear as an exaggeration, especially given 
how American Indians numbered 764,000 at the time of the 
piece’s publication.223 Yet, the notion that Indians were, in fact, 
abandoning their Indigenous heritage to “make it” in mainstream 
American society was as pressing a concern for 1960s Indigenous 
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activists as the socio-economic status of Native Americans.224 By 
1969, the fear that Indigenous heritage would be extinguished 
amidst a larger and ill-disposed white American society had 
reached its pinnacle. In taking Alcatraz, IOAT asserted that, if 
Indigenous peoples were to salvage their remaining traditions 
and ways of life, they needed to break with a white culture that 
had been expecting them to sacrifice their own for “over four 
hundred years.”225 Inspired in large part by the Black Panther 
Party, this mindset translated into an administration of Alcatraz 
that prioritized the flourishing of Indigenous lifeways while 
dismissing white ones.226 Evidence for this reality remains 
especially visible in IOAT’s all-Indian education program, its 
encouragement of other Native American activist movements, 
and its banning of white Americans from the island. 
 During Alcatraz’s November 10 takeover, one of the 
fourteen Native American students present described the former 
prison as nothing but a monument to a “sick society.”227 This 
remark, coupled with a succeeding statement that the activists 
“we’re going to change [Alcatraz] into…a good society…A society 
for Indians” may be seen as foreshadowing IOAT’s administration 
of the Rock.228 For the occupation’s instigators, a “society for 
Indians” represented not only widespread Indian rejection 
of, but a solution to, the federal government’s persecution of 
Indigenous people. Yet, the notion that Native Americans needed 
to collectively wrest control of the forces shaping their welfare 
and dictating their sense of Indianness was not one that IOAT 
independently devised.229 Rather, the urgency, theatricality, and 
unapologetic condemnation of white society with which IOAT 
carried out its occupation was very much an adaptation of “Black 
Power” tactics.230 At a time when War Jack, Fortunate Eagle, and 
Oakes were still searching for a solution to the plight of Native 
Americans, Black Power, as embodied by the Black Panther Party 
for Self-Defense, was taking the Bay Area by storm and providing 
a valuable model for the Rock’s future occupiers.
 “Am I under arrest? Am I under arrest? Take your hands 
off me if I’m not under arrest!” were the shouts of an impassioned 
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Black Panther Party member being escorted out of the California 
state capitol building on May 2, 1967.231 This activist, along with 
twenty-nine other black men and women, had come to the state 
assembly to protest a recent gun-control bill aimed at denying 
Black Panthers the right to arm themselves while following police 
cars.232 In a fashion that would be almost exactly replicated by 
IOAT, these activists read a statement condemning the bill on 
the steps of the Capitol Building, and then marched into the 
legislative chambers’ visitors’ gallery toting the very weapons that 
the assembly was debating taking away.233 The demonstration’s 
main instigator, Huey P. Newton, had planned these events with 
the utmost attention to detail, taking every precaution in the 
weeks prior to ensure their legality.234 Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the protest still resulted in the arrest of the activists present, 
but not before achieving its desired end: nearly every police 
officer, reporter, and TV cameramen in the area flocked to the 
disturbance.235 Despite the efforts of the California Legislature, 
Newton and Bobby G. Seale, cofounder of the Black Panther 
Party, not only succeeded in making their frustrations heard, 
but further advanced the public’s knowledge of their cause. The 
Black Panthers, like the IOAT activists who would follow in their 
footsteps, had no intention of abandoning the spotlight until the 
struggles of black Americans received the attention they were 
due.
 By the time the Alcatraz occupiers were familiarizing 
themselves with the logistics of public disobedience on college 
campuses, the Black Panther Party (BPP) had become the 
talk of the Bay Area.236 Founded in October 1966 by Newton 
and Seale, the BPP was initially formed in response to police 
brutality against black civilians, but quickly became an outlet for 
black Americans disgruntled with the Civil Rights Movement’s 
emphasis on nonviolent protest.237 Under Newton and Seale, 
the party published a ten-point platform entitled “What We 
Want, What We Believe,” the dark irony of which would later be 
matched by IOAT’s “Proclamation to the Great White Father.”238 
Issuing demands ranging from employment to “decent housing, 
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fit for the shelter of human beings” to the exemption of black men 
from military service, the BPP sought everything by way of the 
federal government’s long “overdue debt of forty acres and two 
mules.”239 Yet, perhaps the party’s most unbending demand was 
that African Americans serve as the architects of social reform, a 
condition the Panthers claimed as having been repeatedly denied 
to generations of blacks under racist pretenses.240 For the BPP, 
the current civil rights movement was moving at too slow a 
rate and utilizing too passive a stance to halt the economic and 
cultural assault being launched against black Americans.241 This 
perception, coupled with the belief that the federal government 
was adopting civil rights rhetoric but not putting it into practice, 
translated into the BPP enacting its own reforms.242 The party’s 
police patrols became arguably its most notable, but the Panthers’ 
overarching conviction that only black people could redefine 
their status in American society proved an influential precedent 
for Indigenous activists to come.243
 When War Jack and Oakes encountered the potential 
of large-scale protest, Black Power had become so prominent in 
the Bay Area that other social movements had begun defining 
themselves in relation to it.244 Upon War Jack’s establishment 
of the Native Student Organization at UC-Berkeley, her and 
other activists’ adoption of “Red Power” as a kind of calling for 
Indigenous reform was something she attributed to the example 
set by the BPP: “We didn’t really [come up with the name] ‘Red 
Power.’ That was just something already on campus because 
there was ‘Black Power’…[confrontational Indian activism] was 
difficult for some [Indigenous] people [to understand] because 
[we were still trying] to reestablish [a] link to our cultural 
identity.”245 Of course, for War Jack and the other instigators of 
the Alcatraz takeover, the concept of a shared struggle to maintain 
Indianness was much easier to grasp having “drunk deeply from 
the well” of protest present on college campuses.246 The Panthers’ 
presentation of themselves as “never making an unprovoked 
attack but defending ferociously whenever attacked” struck a 
profound chord with student activists, especially “New Leftist” 
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ones participating in the Third World Liberation Front at UC-
Berkeley and San Francisco State University.247 This organization, 
which recruited both Oakes and War Jack, viewed the absence 
of ethnic studies departments as an affront to “the rights of all 
oppressed peoples,” and launched strikes so extensive in 1968-
69 that they drew the response of Governor Ronald Reagan 
and the California National Guard.248 Influenced by a party 
that demanded social reform immediately rather than at some 
indeterminate point in time, the Third World Liberation protests 
caught the attention of disgruntled young Indians such as Oakes 
and War Jack, while teaching them “all the [protest] tactics” they 
needed to know.249
Painted on a wall at Alcatraz, 1970
 By November 1969, Oakes, War, Jack, and other Indian 
activists who once internally wrestled with the struggle to 
maintain their cultural identity had become seasoned observers 
of demonstrations taking place on college campuses or in Bay 
Area streets. The Black Panther Party had, in the later half of 
the 1960s, broken with the existing Civil Rights Movement 
in advocating a more assertive approach to social reform, one 
that soon worked its way onto the campuses of future IOAT 
members.250 If Bay Area Indians did not observe the BPP’s 
influence on events such as Third World Liberation strikes, they 
heard the party condemn the federal government for promising 
blacks socio-economic advancement without establishing any 
kind of set time frame. They also witnessed the Panthers’ calls 
for young African Americans “to take a look at themselves,” and 
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realize that white Americans had, and always would, allow for the 
subjugation of blacks so long as it was economically profitable.251 
For Panthers such as Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. 
Hamilton, a nonviolent approach to civil rights, which had since 
characterized black activism, represented an approach that “black 
people [could not] afford and a luxury that white people [did 
not] deserve.”252  
 While alarming to mainstream America, the Black 
Panthers’ blatant disregard for the existing social structure and 
the insistence that a persecuted people collectively take hold of 
their identity could not have been more relatable for the architects 
of the Alcatraz takeover. In a manner closely resembling the 
Panthers, occupier Lehman Brightman recalls: “I saw what the 
[BIA] was doing to [Indian] peoples. [It] was screwing them 
around…I saw all the goddamn problems that Indians had in 
urban areas…and I wanted to do something badly [but] there 
was no way [at first]…[So] we [started protesting] for one specific 
reason: just raise goddamn hell! And we raised a hell of a lot of 
hell!”253 The “hell” which Brightman references found ultimate 
expression in Alcatraz’s 1969 occupation, albeit retaining much 
of the boldness, confidence, and demonstrativeness that the Black 
Panthers had exhibited just two years earlier in the California 
State Assembly. In fact, the confidence with which Oakes dictated 
the “Proclamation to the Great White Father” on November 10, 
1969, may be seen as almost exactly mirroring Newton’s reciting 
the California Penal Code to encroaching swarms of Sacramento 
law enforcement and reporters.254 In the years that separated 
the two demonstrations, Oakes and other IOAT activists awoke 
to needing to “rise,” “scream,” “yell” in defense of Indigenous 
culture.255 Their awakening was, however, due in large part to 
observing another group of activists possessing the audacity to 
proclaim to black Americans that “[white men] would whisper a 
prayer, give [their] wives a pill, deny [their] daughters medication, 
put [their] sons on the front lines, and piously blow [their] brains 
out.”256 Shown a model of protest that demanded immediate 
reform while criticizing larger American society, IOAT launched 
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its 1969 occupation as a signal to Native Americans that it was 
now time to “close ranks” between their culture and that of white 
Americans.257
* * * * *
 After observing and adopting many of the BPP’s 
attitudes, the Alcatraz occupiers insisted upon the creation 
of an all-Indian educational complex, one that would serve to 
distance Indigenous culture from the “polluting” effects of white 
influence.258 During a conference between Alcatraz’s spokesmen, 
the OEO and Department of Labor, Stella Leach commented 
that improvements in Indian education were foremost among 
the reforms that the occupiers hoped to achieve.259 The Indian 
education system’s failure to train Native Americans “to return to 
their [reservations] and be of some use to them” proved especially 
problematic to IOAT, and resulted in the group’s demand that a 
cultural complex run and staffed by Indians be constructed on 
the island.260 This institution, in addition to teaching Indigenous 
peoples the technical skills needed to improve their reservations, 
was to educate Indians of all ages concerning their oppression 
“at the hands of white [men].”261 The present situation of Indian 
education was, according to the occupiers, “indoctrinating” 
Native Americans with BIA-sponsored “propaganda” aimed at 
concealing centuries of subjugation by “Uncle Sam.”262 Echoing 
Oakes’s comment that a “dual sense of justice” existed towards 
American Indians, Alcatraz’s occupiers asserted that, if Indians 
were not awarded control over their education, their economic 
destitution and suppression by the federal government would 
only continue to constitute “sad facets of history.”263
 While Indians’ dissatisfaction with their education reached 
a climax in 1969, disgruntlement towards federal administration 
of Indigenous schools has its origins in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. It was during this period that the federal 
government sanctioned the forced removal of Native American 
children from their families to be educated in white boarding 
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schools.264 Although the stated intention of this action was to 
“guide [Indians] in the proper way of living,” later Native American 
generations and activists such as Mankiller and Fortunate Eagle 
came to view the boarding school policy as possessing the same 
aims as Termination and relocation: the destruction of Indigenous 
people’s culture or sense of “Indianness.”265 Approximately fifty 
to sixty years after the decline of Indian boarding schools, the 
conviction that an Indian educational system overseen by the 
U.S. government would continue to cause Indians to forsake 
their culture remained prevalent.266 In an article published just 
months before Alcatraz’s occupation, The Warpath declared the 
BIA, the agency entrusted with administering Indian schools, as 
woefully incapable of understanding “Indian failures and wasted 
lives.”267 Citing the bureau’s employment of 22,000 employees, 
over half of which were non-Indians, and staffing of ninety-five 
percent of its top executive positions with white Americans, the 
article denounced the BIA as not only ignorant of the problems 
endemic to Indigenous communities, but wrongfully claiming 
the authority to address them.268 
 Meanwhile, another article published by The Warpath 
awards further credence to the claim that federal oversight 
of Indian education was figuratively, and sometimes literally, 
killing an Indian’s sense of him or herself. This piece, which 
details the journey of the president of an Indian parent-teachers 
organization to an Indigenous junior high school in Ponca, 
Oklahoma, is nothing short of alarming.269 Over the course of 
one day, Mrs. Martha Grass observes both the school’s passing 
of children who are unable to read to the fourth and fifth grades 
and permitting seventh and eighth grade students to “sniff glue 
and paint [in class].”270 The sight of Indian children with their 
“eyelids puffed closed” and “lips hanging” ultimately leaves Mrs. 
Grass pleading for “something…to be done about our [Native 
American] children…[They] need help!”271 With these realities 
familiar to the occupiers themselves, IOAT both rejected a BIA-
controlled Indian education system and demanded “insulation” 
from a white society out-of-touch with Indigenous struggles and 
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complacent in letting them persist.272
 Convinced that American Indian culture was bound 
to expire under BIA oversight, Alcatraz’s occupiers sought 
the development of a complex that would teach everything 
from engineering to Indigenous medicine to tribal dances and 
songs.273 The overarching purpose of this complex was to produce 
generations of Native Americans who, unlike their predecessors, 
would maintain their American Indian identity while recognizing 
the federal government’s continual “manipulation” of Indigenous 
peoples.274 In order to encourage Indians to maintain their 
“Indianess,” Alcatraz’s educational complex sought the 
flourishing of tribal lifeways by teaching subjects that ranged 
from Indigenous “arts and crafts” to “religious and sacred healing 
ceremonies” to traditional “music [and] dance.”275 The impulse 
for doing so stemmed from the perception that the BIA had long 
educated Indians without any acknowledgement of their cultural 
past, a practice more inclined toward “teaching Indian youth to 
be ashamed of [their Indianness],” rather than proud of it.276 
 In a 1970 statement, IOAT extended its critique of the 
BIA’s education curriculum to the American university system, 
which, although including a small but gradually increasing 
number of Native Americans, offered hardly any courses 
concerning Indigenous history or culture.277 The sense that the 
isolation present on reservations and in urban areas was following 
Indian students to college campuses fueled the conception of 
the complex and its incorporation of an all-Indian vocational 
school.278 The stated intention behind the school’s founding 
was that of enabling Native Americans to return to their 
reservations and address their lack of industrial development.279 
While recognizing the need for Native Americans to “equip 
themselves with the weapons” needed to survive financially, 
IOAT discouraged full immersion in a culture believed to be a 
“façade which Indians [should learn to] hate.”280 Rather, IOAT 
saw “standing outside the American mainstream” as something to 
be valued, precisely because it entailed the maintenance of one’s 
own Indian lifeways instead of assuming “shallow white ones” 
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that included an obsession with wealth and willingness to wage 
war.281 The continuation of skills such as traditional Indian dance, 
language, crafts, and medicine all constituted a larger effort to 
encourage Native Americans to see themselves not as a “pitiful” 
demographic, but as descendants of “once great peoples” whose 
“nobility” and “sovereignty” should and could be resurrected.282 
 In addition to restoring a sense of honor in claiming 
Native American heritage, Alcatraz’s educational complex sought 
to inform its students of the perils of dealing with an indifferent 
and, at times, hostile federal government. Vital to this effort was 
the complex’s inclusion of an American Indian Museum, which, 
according to Oakes’s November 20 Proclamation, would feature 
Native American “cultural contributions to the world” as well as 
“some of the things white men [had] first given to…Indians”: 
“disease, alcohol, poverty, and cultural decimation.”283 With the 
museum focusing on the earliest encounters between Indigenous 
peoples and white Europeans, the remainder of the complex 
intended to teach facets of American Indian history “concealed” 
by BIA curriculum.284
 Foremost among the “sad historical facets” to be displayed 
by IOAT’s museum was the U.S. government’s longstanding 
use of “divide and conquer techniques.”285 Be they in the form 
of reservations, Termination, or relocation, these policies were 
to be denounced as keeping Indians physically separated from 
one another and incapable of unifying in opposition of federal 
policies.286 Having revealed these techniques as geared towards 
outright American Indian “genocide,” Alcatraz’s cultural complex 
would educate its students concerning the many hardships 
endured by Native Americans, hardships that, although “censored” 
by the BIA, included “surrendering an entire continent” and 
making treaties in return for “basic services like health care” 
that were never received.287 Decades of overlooking the federal 
government’s mistreatment of Indigenous peoples were, in the 
occupiers’ opinions, over, and it was the explicit intention of the 
Rock’s complex to see this change in Indian education through.
 Furthermore, Alcatraz’s cultural complex sought to ensure 
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that American Indian youth would reject the lure of “middle-class 
white status,” as was the supposed intention of “white oriented 
university machinery,” in exchange for becoming counselors 
and elders within their own Indigenous communities.288 It was 
within these leadership positions that graduates of the complex 
could maneuver disputes between the federal government and 
their peoples, conflicts that, encompassing everything from land 
ownership rights to those of religious practice, could determine 
whether Indigenous lifeways would subsist or be eradicated.289 
Of course, these struggles, as described by Harvey Wells, could 
never be won unless Native Americans were first instilled with 
the the sense that they, rather than the “non-Indians running the 
BIA,” could govern their own futures.290 Therefore, the ultimate 
“mission” of Alcatraz’s educational complex was not only to 
encourage a sense of pride in being Native American, but also 
to reveal that such pride had long been under siege by a white 
society intent on “cramming” its own lifeways “down [Indians’] 
throats.”291 From IOAT’s perspective, white American influence 
had spent decades, and in many respects, centuries, eroding 
Indians’ conviction that they themselves could affect change in 
their lives and communities. The decision to occupy Alcatraz and 
establish a cultural complex represented a long latent desire to 
reverse this trend, ultimately presenting itself when the dismal 
state of Indian education became too much to bear.
* * * * *
 While the development of an all-Indian educational 
complex reflected a desire to salvage Indigenous culture, 
Alcatraz’s occupiers’ public support for other Native American 
resistance movements also illustrates a passion for the survival of 
Indian culture over white society’s caustic influence. In a 1970 
“manifesto” published by IOAT, Alcatraz’s occupiers declared 
that “All Indian problems, whether of an individual or tribe, must 
be shared by all. To separate now at this great potential time of 
unity, is to become extinct.”292 Convinced that most Indigenous 
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movements devoted themselves to Indian unity only to “fade, 
die, or become entangled in bureaucratic manipulations,” IOAT 
viewed its motivations as not only resembling, but directly 
paralleling those driving other contemporary American Indian 
protests.293
 The glaring difference between Alcatraz and other 
unfolding Indigenous movements was, however, a lack of media 
attention, an element which the Rock’s holders sought to provide. 
Irene Silentman is one activist who references this intention, 
positing in February 1970 that “[Alcatraz], if handled right, 
[could] bring the problems of Indians to the attention of the 
average American…If the average American picks up a newspaper 
and reads about Pyramid Lake…it doesn’t concern [him/her]…
but Alcatraz…that concerns everybody.”294 “Pyramid Lake” was 
among a number of Native American protests occurring at the 
time of Alcatraz’s holding, and its success according to IOAT 
constituted a larger struggle over whether “Indians would once 
more be responsible for their destinies.”295 Clyde Bellecourt, 
an Ojibwe Indian and co-founder of the American Indian 
Movement (AIM), was just one activist who affirms this mindset, 
describing Alcatraz’s “legacies” as “many” but believing that its 
encouragement of the “long, [shared] Indian fight” emerged 
foremost among them.296
 Imbued with the sense that the federal government 
had long kept Indians and their struggle to maintain their 
identity divided, IOAT made its unequivocal support for other 
Indigenous movements of its era known through publicizing 
protests at Pyramid Lake, Round Valley, and Washington State. 
Through its Indians of All Tribes newsletter, radio broadcasts, 
and interviews with local and national media, IOAT not only 
aimed to highlight the injustices being levied against Indians at 
these sites, but also to encourage its Native American audience to 
join the movements themselves. Evidence for this is first seen in 
IOAT’s coverage of the resistance movement then taking place at 
Pyramid Lake (NV), and its encouragement of Native American 
activists to align themselves against a common adversary: “never 
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satisfied and greedy” white farmers and ranchers.297 
 By 1970, Pyramid Lake, which refers both to the 
reservation that houses the Paiute Tribe and the thirty by eight 
mile lake which has served as the tribe’s sacred fishing territory, 
was drying up thirty to fifty inches a year due to its being diverted 
away from the reservation.298 Specifically, the state was using the 
lake’s water to nourish the cattle of the aforementioned farmers 
and ranchers as well as create ponds for white duck hunters “to 
play in.”299 With the Paiutes protesting the diminishment of their 
sacred lake, Alcatraz’s occupiers’ saw one of the “first opportunities” 
to carry out the “dream” embodied by their cultural complex.300 
Through the second and third publications of its newsletter, 
IOAT organized and then related the experiences of a caravan of 
forty Native American activists to Pyramid Lake, describing their 
journey as “furthering the cause of Indian unity” against “a blind 
government” and preserving “the magic” that takes place when 
Paiutes are able to “roam their ancient shorelines.”301 Equally as 
prominent in these publications is the caravan’s description of 
Sparks, Nevada, a casino town passed on their trip, as a white 
man’s “spell,” characterized by “flashing neon and pink-eyed slot 
machines…plastic entertainment…visions of fortune won and 
re-won in nightmare nirvana…[and] sad greeds that blow the 
mind to hate.”302 Unrelenting in its criticisms of the “white men” 
responsible for Pyramid Lake’s depletion, IOAT’s administering 
Alcatraz in a manner aimed to preserve Indian sovereignty is on 
full display in its covering the Paiute protests.
 Just as IOAT undertook efforts to circulate the events 
at Pyramid Lake, the group’s publicizing of the Indigenous 
resistance movement unfolding at the Round Valley Reservation 
(CA) is another instance of its wanting to protect Native 
American culture from the federal government’s unwelcome 
presence. While the protests at Round Valley may have been 
reaching a climax in the midst of the Alcatraz occupation, IOAT 
and the various tribes housed on the reservation declared the 
struggle rooted in an “old [U.S. government] trick.”303 Although 
the Army Corp of Engineers assured that the construction of the 
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Dos Rios Dam over Round Valley would leave the Indians there 
“better off than before,” the reservation’s inhabitants viewed the 
federal government as employing the same deceitfulness used to 
manipulate the Seneca Indians into surrendering their reservation 
land just a decade prior.304
 When the Round Valley Indians publicly questioned 
the Army Corps’ assertion that their reservation needed to be 
flooded to supply Southern Californians with water, IOAT’s 
newsletters denounced the Dos Rios Dam as the conception 
of “white barons” aiming to grow federally subsidized groups, 
add to the food surplus, and grow richer.305 Although promised 
that the dam’s building would facilitate tourism in the southern 
half of the state, the profits of which would supposedly be 
extended to the Indians themselves, the Round Valley residents 
dismissed guarantees of wealth from resorts and tourist sites as 
empty as those once made to the Seneca tribe.306 Echoing these 
claims in its third newsletter publication, IOAT emboldened 
the Round Valley Indians’ objection to the dam by declaring it 
a “conspiracy” orchestrated by the Army Corp and the “good 
old” BIA.307 Adamant that if attention and action were not soon 
drawn to the conflict, IOAT asserted that “water would flow” 
over the Round Valley Reservation and that “grass would grow 
over the bones” of its inhabitants, just as the flooding of the 
Seneca Reservation had erased the land’s sacred Cornplanter 
burial grounds.308 Concluding that the fight of the Round Valley 
Indians was the same fight that Native Americans had always 
been waging against a government more loyal to profits than 
honoring Indigenous lifeways, IOAT warned that it would soon 
be too late to salvage the Round Valley Indians and tribes faced 
with similar predicaments.309
 In a manner mirroring its broadcasting of the Round Valley 
protests, IOAT undertook significant efforts to present the Native 
American resistance movements taking place in Washington 
State as longstanding fights against forced assimilation into 
white society. As mentioned earlier, Native American protests in 
Washington State had been inaugurated decades before Alcatraz’s 
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takeover by activists such as Billy Frank and Bob Satiacum.310 
By 1969, Native American fishing rights, particularly as they 
pertained to the Nisqually, Puyallup, and Muckleshoot tribes, 
had emerged at the forefront of Indigenous resistance movements 
in the state.311 Due in large part to the efforts of Hank Adams, 
a Sioux-Assiniboine activist, the aforementioned tribes began 
participating in “fish-ins” in 1963 to protest their barring from 
traditional fishing grounds being used to accommodate white 
sportsmen and fisheries.312 With their protests well underway 
by 1969 but struggling to garner attention outside the Pacific 
Northwest, IOAT publicized the Washington Indians’ struggle 
and welcomed Al Bridges, a Nisqually “fish-in” organizer, to sell 
“freedom fish” at San Francisco’s Pier 40.313 After meeting Bridges 
and traveling to confer with Adams in Washington, the Alcatraz 
Indians of All Tribes editorial staff praised the Pacific Northwest 
activists for refusing to surrender their “Indian way of life…to 
be…assimilated into white society,” and encouraged readers to 
make donations to the fish-ins.314 
 In addition to praising Indigenous activists such as 
Adams, IOAT also promoted the traveling of other Indians to 
partake in the Washington protests. In March 1970, IOAT’s 
newsletter denounced the arrest of 77 activists who, mirroring 
the Alcatraz occupiers, invaded the U.S. military’s Fort Lawton 
under the title “United Indians of All Tribes” (UIAT).315 Hailing 
the invasion as a necessary step towards maintaining Indians’ 
“basic livelihood and survival,” IOAT expressed no remorse for 
opposing the “greedy, white-controlled fisheries” considered to 
be the cause of the controversy.316 In a resounding testament 
to its conviction that the continuation of Native American 
culture was under assault by white society, IOAT concluded its 
coverage of the Washington State protests with the statement: 
“We must once more live in dignity and take the responsibilities 
of our own destinies…THERE WILL BE NO MORE 
COMPROMISES!”317 Alcatraz’s occupiers, in effect, viewed 
compromise as contributing to the federal onslaught against 
Indian property and the Indigenous heritage tied intimately to it. 
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Centuries of cooperation with impersonal and white-controlled 
institutions had, in IOAT’s opinion, created a crisis concerning 
Indians’ sovereignty over their education, homelands, and distinct 
identity as Native Americans. For Alcatraz’s occupiers, a crisis 
of this magnitude had long warranted drastic action, not only 
through one Indigenous demonstration but the sustainment of 
countless others.
* * * * *
 Although less advertised than IOAT’s proposed all-Indian 
educational complex and encouragement of other Indigenous 
movements, the Alcatraz occupiers’ banning of white Americans 
and, at times, white cultural norms is another reflection of the 
toxicity they attributed to mainstream American society. IOAT’s 
forbidding white Americans seems to have been both ideological 
and practical, especially considering the nineteen-month 
stalemate between the occupiers and the U.S. Coast Guard.318 
By 1970, the Coast Guard in collaboration with the GSA had 
cut off all utilities to the island and placed a barricade around it, 
thereby inducing numerous confrontations between patrolmen 
and Indigenous activists attempting to breach the barrier via 
speedboat.319 Although federal authorities were under orders to 
refrain from removing the occupiers altogether, IOAT remained 
convinced that the Coast Guard and GSA were waiting for some 
kind of “slip up” that would warrant the activists’ arrest.320 John 
Trudell captures this conviction best in a June 1970 interview, 
when, after being questioned over whether authorities would 
find reason to remove Alcatraz’s occupiers, replied, “The 
[federal government] has been stopping Indians’ [protests] on 
technicalities for a hundred years. Why should they change 
now?”321 The fear that the passage of whites, be they Indigenous 
sympathizers or ordinary civilians, to and from the island could 
serve as one factor among many justifying the occupation’s end 
undoubtedly fostered IOAT’s belief that insularity amongst 
the resistance group was integral to its cause. However, there 
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was also an unmistakable sociopolitical component to the 
ban, as Alcatraz’s occupiers viewed the survival of Indigenous 
culture as requiring literal separation from the white society 
and bureaucracy encroaching on it. Instilled with the belief 
that mainstream society had and always would treat Native 
Americans “differently” and “separately,” IOAT concluded that 
its movement and the flourishing of Indian lifeways naturally 
required “remaining separately.”322
 Within just days of their November 20 takeover, 
Alcatraz’s occupiers manifested their mistrust towards white 
culture and conviction that it was eroding Indigenous identity at 
a Thanksgiving celebration. This festival was funded entirely by 
donors, many of whom were white, and characterized by peace 
pipe smoking, rock music, and a fall-oriented feast, all considered 
shared Indian practices, be they past or present.323 Publicized by 
IOAT as open to Indians across the country, the festival proved 
to be as antagonistic towards white society as encouraging 
towards Indian unity.324 On the eve of the occupiers’ second 
Thanksgiving in 1970, LaNada War Jack declared that IOAT’s 
previous celebration and its upcoming one sought to reclaim 
an aspect of Native American history that had been perverted 
by mainstream American society.325 Asserting that Indians had 
practiced fall harvests for hundreds of years, War Jack denounced 
the so-called “first Thanksgiving” between whites and Native 
Americans as the result of “white people starving” after arriving 
in America, and celebrating with Indians only because they 
“had to.”326 In an effort to no longer let white Americans “live 
a lie,” War Jack rebuked any donations made under the pretense 
that they would be preserving some long-standing goodwill 
between Indians and whites.327 This remark, as well as War Jack’s 
affirmation that whites would again be barred from the festival, 
reveal both an effort to reclaim a well-established Indian custom 
while distancing Indian lifeways from the distorting influence of 
white society.
 In addition to IOAT’s banning white participation in the 
occupiers’ Thanksgiving celebrations, the group’s insistence that 
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white Americans be barred from the island altogether is another 
reflection of its desire to divorce itself from mainstream American 
culture. In a February 1970 interview, Stella Leach insisted that 
the occupiers had “one very simple rule” regarding outsiders: the 
only non-Indians allowed to visit Alcatraz would be the press 
and doctors and lawyers representing the activists themselves.328 
With doctors and lawyers administering much needed medical 
care and legal advice in the midst of a government barricade, 
the permitting of news reporters was meant to keep national 
attention on the occupiers’ cause.329 Media access to the island 
flooded news broadcasts with images of an Indian-controlled 
Alcatraz that, in its year and a half duration, sported signs and 
graffitied buildings with one particularly unmistakable message: 
“Indian Land: Keep Out!”330 
 Keeping white Americans off Alcatraz proved to be a 
position that the occupiers meant quite literally, as in March 
1971, John Trudell revealed to Bay Area media that IOAT was 
growing frustrated with tour boats circling the island trying to 
catch a glimpse of the unfolding “Indian spectacle.”331 Teeming 
with white passengers, Trudell crossly denounced these Bay Area 
boat rides as treating the occupiers like curiosities in a “zoo.”332 For 
IOAT, the “sightseeing” denounced by Trudell only strengthened 
a laden conviction that white society and the institutions it 
entrusted with managing Indian affairs were simply incapable of 
understanding the plight of Native Americans and thus the aims 
of the occupation. Although the intentions of Alcatraz’s holding 
were deeply personal to IOAT and other non-participating 
Indians, the sense that white Americans viewed the movement as 
“fun” or “entertainment” confirmed perceptions that Indigenous 
peoples would never escape a labeling that, at best, deemed 
them “symbols” of some great but bygone American era.333 Such 
depreciation toward IOAT’s cause not only overlooked the fact 
that the occupiers’ were, at least at the outset of their movement, 
well-organized, but offered resounding affirmation that Native 
American lifeways were bound to dwindle in a society unwilling 
to respect them.
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 Less than three weeks after Alcatraz’s November 20 taking, 
Kim Robertson, San Francisco’s regional GSA representative, 
led an aforementioned party of OEO and Department of 
Labor representatives onto the island to “visualize the problems 
underlying [the occupation].”334 Smoking a pipe and strolling at 
the head of the group, Robertson answered reporters in a manner 
so vague that many of the media personnel present struggled to 
figure out who he or the organization he represented was. “I am 
the current regional council [of ] this group [that] you see here of 
the essentially organized federal agency that has resources available 
for employment, training, housing, education, health, and similar 
matters” was among Robertson’s first statements to reporters, an 
announcement so unclear that one of the journalists interrupted 
him with the remark, “So you’re the regional council of what 
exactly?”335 As if this declaration was not ambiguous enough, 
Robertson followed his introduction by declaring that he might 
be able to respond to the occupiers’ demands, “assuming they 
[were] viable concepts,” “through various national headquarters 
[in the form] of a coordinated response.”336 Clearly content with 
his answers, Robertson, with his fellow representatives on his 
heels, proceeded to make his way toward the building where the 
meeting would be held, inspiring another journalist to exclaim, 
“Wait, what did that guy even say his name was?”337 
 Although it is ungrounded to presume that Robertson 
had little intention of addressing the occupiers’ grievances, the 
unimpressed looks and responses that he proceeded to draw from 
Oakes and other IOAT representatives at their December 10 
meeting suggest that the occupiers saw him as the embodiment 
of the very thing that they were protesting: an indifferent, 
uninformed, and impersonal federal bureaucracy.338 It was this 
bureaucracy, controlled by white Americans as ignorant as those 
who tried to catch a glimpse of Indian-controlled Alcatraz on tour 
boats, that the Rock’s occupiers’ viewed as having “sat around” 
with Indians for centuries, talking about reforms for Indigenous 
peoples but “getting nothing done.”339 A reflection of a society 
that cared little for Indian lifeways and, at times, encouraged 
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their eradication, the federal government and its administration 
of Native American welfare were nothing short of a “national 
disgrace” for Alcatraz’s occupiers.340 
 Therefore, be it in Uncle Sam’s oversight of Indian 
education or suppression of Indigenous resistance movements, 
Indian culture, was, in IOAT’s eyes, dying, and needed to be 
salvaged before it was completely forgotten. In a refusal to “just 
sit back” and watch their culture vanish, the Alcatraz occupiers 
sought the founding of an all-Indian educational complex, 
encouraged other Indigenous protests, and unapologetically 
restricted white Americans from visiting the island.341 Declaring 
in the second publication of its newsletter that non-Indian society 
had long “cloaked the Indian in complete darkness,” IOAT 
proclaimed that its actions had removed the “shroud” that once 
surrounded Native Americans.342 Now, according to the Alcatraz 
occupiers, Indians were “shouting their grievances to the world,” 
and they would be heard whether Americans wanted to listen or 
not.343
Conclusion
 On June 11, 1971, Alcatraz’s remaining fifteen occupiers 
found themselves apprehended by over thirty U.S. marshals, 
brought back to the California mainland, and herded onto a 
school bus headed for a San Francisco law office.344 Upon arriving 
at the office, a teenage activist’s exclamation “power to the Indian 
people!” drew the attention of one of the marshals, who, although 
his response is not entirely audible, seems to have instructed the 
young protestor to “calm down.”345 The activist’s reply all but 
encapsulates the attitude that the Alcatraz occupiers exhibited 
towards federal authority: “Shut the hell up!”346 Perhaps a fitting 
last remark for a movement that, for nineteen months, rejected 
almost all of “what [white] civilization [had to] offer,” Alcatraz’s 
1969 takeover deserves recognition as the culmination of decades 
of Native American discontent.347 Occupier Harvey Wells’ 
aforementioned remark that the Alcatraz occupiers belonged 
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to a generation of Indians who, rather than conceiving the idea 
of resistance, adopted it from their predecessors and put it into 
practice could not be more accurate.348 As described by activist 
George Horse Capture, Alcatraz’s occupation was far from some 
spontaneous protest spurred by the disgruntlements of a handful 
of college students. Rather, Alcatraz was an event which came to 
fruition when Indians, “instead of passively withdrawing” from 
an era of national upheaval, “stepped forward…and [made it] 
known that they were…proud, and [that] their present situation 
must and would change.”349 The Alcatraz occupiers, in other 
words, arrived on the island on November 10, 1969, with an 
“idea,” a concept whose aims of shedding light on years of 
American Indian suppression were goals that the Rock’s holders 
had every intention of seeing through.350
 Of course, it is worthwhile to recognize that, despite a 
steadfast nineteen-month holdout, IOAT’s struggle against the 
federal government was doomed from the outset, especially 
as it pertained to winning outright title to Alcatraz. Although 
activists such as Joe Bill promised “a good fight” in the event 
that the federal government tried to expel the occupiers, IOAT’s 
takeover was, from its beginning, operating on borrowed time.351 
As explained by Brad Patterson, special assistant to President 
Richard Nixon, federal authorities were “never going to build 
a university on Alcatraz or give [the occupiers] $300,000 for a 
cultural [complex] or even give them title to Alcatraz…This was 
not anything [they] were going to do.”352 Mr. Hannon, who, 
although having jested with Oakes during their November 1969 
encounter, awards credence to Patterson’s position in a December 
1969 interview, where he coldly describes himself as “not at all” 
willing to let the Alcatraz activists remain on the island.353 
 Yet, even with the U.S. marshals’ 1971 intervention, 
Indians’ discontent with federal oversight and the quality of life 
that came with it had reached an unmistakable breaking point. 
In an ironic precursor to the 1969 invasion, a citizens’ coalition 
in San Francisco declared that same year that Alcatraz’s sale 
would lead to its commercialization and end as one of the “true 
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gems in…[the] Bay Area.”354 When questioned as to why it had 
taken the group over two years to form, the coalition’s spokesman 
asserted that resistance movements “never form until a crisis point 
is reached.”355 For Alcatraz’s Indian occupiers, the crisis point for 
Native American livelihood had been mounting decades if not 
centuries prior to November ’69. The events of November 10 
and 20, 1969, do not, in other words, reflect some newfound 
aversion to the injustices being imposed on Native Americans. 
Rather, they are indicative of the sense that Indigenous welfare 
and culture would grow unsalvageable so long as there wasn’t 
large-scale action. A “dead rock” so far as it remained owned and 
operated by white Americans, Alcatraz represented an ideal means 
for Native Americans to “reexamine their acquiescence to the 
non-Indian world” in the event that they could build upon it.356 
In never receiving title to the Rock, IOAT’s hope of transforming 
America’s Devil Island into a symbol of Indian prosperity fell 
by the wayside, but its passion for Indigenous pride would be 
repeatedly resurrected in the years that followed.
 The resurgence of IOAT’s call for Native American 
advancement presented itself early and often in the 1970s, 
beginning with a press conference on the eve of the last fifteen 
Alcatraz occupiers’ removal. It was here that John Trudell, after 
being asked whether the protestors’ arrest meant defeat for Indian 
activism, broadly smiled and exclaimed: “Nah, man, there is no 
such thing as defeat! We’re going to bandage up the bruises and 
stand up again. [The government] didn’t beat us!”357 Trudell’s 
comment could not be more accurate given how, just a little more 
than a year after the takeover’s end, approximately five hundred 
Indian activists occupied the BIA building in Washington D.C. 
for six days.358 Organized in part by Clyde Bellecourt, who had 
communicated with Oakes concerning the Alcatraz occupiers’ 
security, the building’s taking spawned from the caravanning 
of Native Americans to D.C. to protest poor Indigenous living 
conditions and unwanted federal influence in Indian affairs.359 
Then, only a few months after the BIA occupation, some two 
hundred Native American activists occupied the town of 
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Wounded Knee, South Dakota, out of disgust for corruption on 
the Pine Ridge Reservation and the failure of the U.S. government 
to respect treaties made with Indigenous peoples.360 Although 
succumbing after seventy-one days to a coalition of FBI officers 
and U.S. marshals, the Wounded Knee occupation was far from 
the final Indigenous protest of its era as over five thousand Indian 
activists participated in the 1978 “Longest Walk” on Washington 
D.C.361 Launched in opposition to legislation jeopardizing 
Indian land and water rights, the march on Washington began 
with an inaugural ceremony on Alcatraz, the site where Indian 
activists had promised the beginning of a “new Indian life and 
philosophy” based upon uniting Indigenous voices and making 
them heard.362 As described by Bellecourt, Alcatraz, regardless 
of IOAT’s failure to secure ownership of the island, remains 
indisputable in providing the model and networks needed to 
mobilize Indians in 1972, ’73, and ’78.363 Alcatraz’s reclamation 
by the federal government may have ended Indian activism on 
the Rock, but IOAT’s move against a political system slow to 
respond to Indian needs ignited a movement which activist Peter 
Blue Cloud promised would “encompass the world.”364
 The Alcatraz occupation’s legacy as the event which 
inaugurated a decade of Native American Red Power is certainly 
fitting but, at times, emphasized to a fault. Unapologetic in 
their critiques of the federal government and their willingness 
to translate them into action, Alcatraz’s occupiers became an 
inspiration to Indians disillusioned with their lowly status, but 
uncertain over whether to challenge it. Yet, the very fact that 
the occupiers and the activists who followed in their footsteps 
were experiencing anger and confusion prior to their protests 
affirms Wilma Mankiller’s description of Indian pride as “a 
very low flame” that, although contained for decades, was relit 
by Alcatraz.365 The ‘69 takeover indeed ignited an era of Indian 
pride and resistance, but the kindling upon which it raged is too 
often forgotten in examining the upheavals it created. While 
historians such as Shreve, Strange, Loo, Rosier, Smith, Johnson, 
and Nagel have been sure to acknowledge Alcatraz’s occupation 
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as not having arisen spontaneously, the motivations that fueled 
the protest are too often glossed over and described as broadly as 
“brewing for decades” or “[going back] quite some time.”366 
 Instead, the grievances which inspired a protest of 
Alcatraz’s magnitude deserve recognition as specific to mid-
twentieth century Indian welfare, encompassing both the socio-
economic status of Native Americans and the seemingly endless 
struggle of Indigenous peoples to maintain their Indianness. As 
it pertains to socio-economic status, Alcatraz’s occupiers viewed 
destitute Indian reservations, their termination through federal 
policy, and the relocation of Indigenous peoples in urban areas 
as central to their financial and social struggles. The dying of 
Indigenous culture, meanwhile, was attributed by IOAT to a 
white American society that was, at its mildest, apathetic to the 
survival of Indian lifeways. Adopting much of the Black Panther 
Party’s rhetoric and resistance tactics, the Alcatraz occupiers 
took specific aim at the BIA’s oversight of Indian education, the 
overwhelming odds that tribes faced against state and federal 
governments, and white Americans’ patronization of Indigenous 
culture. These critiques, which stemmed from the conviction 
that Indigenous lifeways would whither if exposed to mainstream 
American society, led IOAT to administer the island in a 
manner encouraging of Native customs and dismissive of white 
influence. All this considered, discussion of the ’69 takeover and 
the era of Indian activism that it ushered in grows increasingly 
one-dimensional without sufficient mention of the activists’ 
motivations. Alcatraz’s occupation may be the beginning of a 
large-scale movement, but it’s culmination of decades of silent 
American Indian frustration is equally irrefutable. 
 In a December 1989 episode of Bay Sunday, a San 
Francisco talk show hosted by Barbara Rodgers, former Alcatraz 
occupier Sacheen LittleFeather affirms the ’69 occupation as an 
event whose inspirations were not only complex but mounting 
steadily in the years preceding the Rock’s takeover.367 The piece, 
which features the two women in a well-furnished studio, shows 
LittleFeather responding to whether a certain “rallying cry” 
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inspired her to participate in the takeover.368 Likely aware that 
such a question could not be answered so specifically let alone in 
the course of a five-minute interview, LittleFeather opts to explain 
a Hopi prophecy which describes Native Americans receiving a 
“sign of Red Power” in the Pacific ocean.369 This sign is to mark 
the beginning of a new era of Native American prosperity, but 
before Indians can observe it, they have to be driven all the way 
from the East Coast of the United States to the West Coast.370 
Not surprisingly, LittleFeather identifies Alcatraz as this symbol 
and thus the fulfillment of the prophecy, but her mentioning the 
tribulation that Indians have to endure beforehand alludes to the 
’69 takeover’s lead-up being as far-reaching as its aftermath.371 Just 
as the Indians in the Hopi prophecy encounter hardship before 
revival, those responsible for Alcatraz’s takeover were plagued 
by a wide range of misfortunes leading up to their movement. 
Although LittleFeather does not mention the struggles that this 
work cites as primarily responsible for the occupation, her fellow 
occupiers and other Indigenous activists repeatedly do. These 
grievances brought Native American activism to unprecedented 
heights in the 1970s, but the effort to salvage Indian livelihood 
that began in San Francisco Bay would never have taken 
place had Indigenous peoples not been driven there out of 
desperation. Alcatraz’s occupation is, in other words, as two-fold 
as LittleFeather’s prophecy, and no understanding of the event’s 
outpouring of Indigenous pride will ever be complete unless one 
considers how it arrived there in the first place.
 
Indian activists on Alcatraz in 1970
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